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Abstract 
The central research question of this thesis is the potential of fiscal policy to stabilise 
asymmetric shocks and macroeconomic fluctuations at the level of EMU member states, 
with a special focus on external imbalances. 
After a short introduction, Chapter 2 analyses in a small open economy DSGE model 
the potential of fiscal policy to attenuate current account imbalances. The focus is on 
fiscal policy rules that adjust the overall level of government expenditure. This chapter 
finds that, in case of productivity and risk-premium shocks, a counter-cyclical fiscal 
response to the current account can help stabilising most of the macroeconomic 
variables, independently of the underlying exchange rate regime. However, stabilising 
the current account via fiscal policy intervention comes at the price of higher variability 
of output in the short-run. 
Chapter 3 examines in a two-sector DSGE model whether shifting government 
purchases between tradable and non-tradable goods can help to reduce external 
fluctuations without large swings in the overall fiscal stance. The policy rules 
considered are budgetary-neutral in the sense that the overall level of government 
expenditure is kept constant. This policy rule is compared to fiscal devaluation as a 
strategy to reduce external imbalances and find that state-dependent changes in the 
composition of government purchases between tradables and non-tradables (T/NT) can 
stabilise excessive fluctuations in the event of economy-wide supply and demand 
shocks. Contrary to fiscal devaluation, the expenditure-shifting rule faces a trade-off 
between stabilising domestic activity and enhancing household welfare, on the one 
hand, and reducing excessive fluctuations in external positions, on the other hand. 
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Chapter 4 builds upon the model developed in Chapter 3 but focuses on budgetary-
neutral fiscal rules that adjust the composition of government purchases in response to 
domestic business cycle indicators as a stabilisation tool when fiscal limits are tight. 
This chapter finds that state-dependent reallocation of government purchases between 
tradable and non-tradable goods stabilises domestic activity and reduces the welfare 
costs of economy-wide and sector-specific shocks. Potential welfare gains of such 
policy rules are higher than welfare gains from standard counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
rules. Contrary to standard deficit spending policies, the state-dependent expenditure 
composition rules avoid the trade-off between, first, counter-cyclical spending and, 
second, consolidation needs in economic downturns in the presence of explicit or 
implicit deficit and debt limits. 
Chapter 5 deals with TARGET2 imbalances in the euro area. This chapter evaluates the 
current economic costs and profits of German claims on the Eurosystem through 
TARGET2. While Germany’s nominal profits from holding TARGET2 claims depend 
on the development of the nominal interest rate, the real profits are determined by the 
real interest rate as well as the real exchange rate. This chapter finds that at the end of 
2013 Germany faces current losses of around 13 billion euros in real terms. Calculating 
the profits and losses of every member country in the euro area reveals that the 
TARGET2 system works as an implicit distribution mechanism and underlines the 
aspect that, even without an euro area break-up or exit of one member-country, holding 
TARGET2 claims can cause high economic costs in real terms. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die zentrale Forschungsfrage dieser Dissertation ist, inwiefern Fiskalpolitik 
stabilisierend auf asymmetrische Schocks und daraus entstehende makroökonomische 
Konjunkturzyklen wirken kann. Ein besonderer Fokus liegt dabei auf 
außenwirtschaftlichen Ungleichgewichten. Das einführende Kapitel motiviert die 
Problemstellung und gibt einen Überblick über die unterschiedlichen Aufsätze und 
deren Ergebnisse.  
Kapitel 2 untersucht mithilfe eines Modells einer kleinen offenen Volkswirtschaft die 
makroökonomischen Auswirkungen eines Angebots- und Nachfrageschocks innerhalb 
zweier Wechselkursregime – innerhalb oder außerhalb einer Währungsunion – sowie 
das Stabilisierungspotential der Fiskalpolitik für Leistungsbilanzungleichgewichte. Die 
Analyse zeigt für beide Schocks, dass eine bewusste antizyklische Reaktion der 
Fiskalpolitik auf die Leistungsbilanz stabilisierend wirken kann, unabhängig vom 
zugrundeliegenden Wechselkursregime. Jedoch entsteht ein Trade-off zwischen 
Leistungsbilanz- und Produktionsstabilisierung. 
Aufbauend auf einem Zweisektorenmodell einer kleinen offenen Volkswirtschaft 
innerhalb einer Währungsunion geht Kapitel 3 der Frage nach, ob eine sektorale 
Umschichtung der staatlichen Ausgaben, insbesondere zwischen handelbaren und nicht-
handelbaren Gütern, zu einer Stabilisierung der Handelsbilanz beitragen kann. Die 
Besonderheit dieser sektoralen Umschichtung ist deren Budgetneutralität, d.h., dass die 
Gesamtausgaben des Staates konstant bleiben. Dabei dient das Szenario einer 
fiskalischen Abwertung – verstanden als eine einkommensneutrale Umschichtung der 
Steuerlast zwischen Lohn- und Mehrwertsteuer – als Benchmark, um die Effektivität 
der budgetneutralen Politikregel zu bewerten. Es zeigt sich, dass temporäre sektorale 
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Ausgabenumschichtungen des Staates die Handelsbilanz stabilisieren können. Im 
Gegensatz zur fiskalischen Abwertung ergibt sich jedoch ein Trade-off zwischen der 
Stabilisierung der inländischen Ökonomie und damit einhergehender positiver 
Wohlfahrtseffekte einerseits sowie der Reduzierung von hohen Handelsbilanz-
ungleichgewichten andererseits.  
Kapitel 4 nutzt die Modellstruktur von Kapitel 3, erweitert jedoch die Fragestellung in 
mehreren Dimensionen: (i) Fokussierung der staatlichen Umschichtungspolitik auf 
inländische Konjunkturschwankungen, (ii) klassisch antizyklische Staatsausgabenregel 
als Benchmark, (iii) zusätzliche sektorspezifische Schocks sowie (iv) eine detailliertere 
Wohlfahrtsanalyse unter Berücksichtigung verschiedener Steuerarten. Die Simulationen 
zeigen, dass eine sektorale Umschichtung der Staatsausgaben bei den untersuchten 
Schocks sowohl stabilisierend als auch wohlfahrtssteigernd wirkt. Die potentiellen 
Wohlfahrtsgewinne liegen über denen der klassischen antizyklischen 
Staatsausgabenregel. Die Gründe hierfür liegen im Zusammenspiel der 
Ausgabenneutralität sowie der Stabilisierung der Produktion und der Steuerbasis. Somit 
generiert eine sektorale Umschichtung der Staatsausgaben gerade bei bereits hohem 
Schuldenstand potentielle Stabilisierungsmöglichkeiten. 
Kapitel 5 beschäftigt sich mit den TARGET2-Bilanzen innerhalb der Währungsunion. 
Im Speziellen werden die tatsächlichen realen Verluste der TARGET2-Forderungen 
Deutschlands gegenüber dem Eurosystem berechnet. Während Deutschland durch die 
Verzinsung der TARGET2-Forderungen zwar nominale Zinsgewinne erwirtschaftet, 
müssen für eine Berechnung der tatsächlichen realen Gewinne und Verluste die 
Realzinsen und der reale Wechselkurs berücksichtigt werden. Die Berechnungen weisen 
darauf hin, dass Deutschland bis Ende 2013 ca. 13 Milliarden Euro an realen Verlusten 
entstanden sind. Hochrechnungen für die übrigen Mitgliedsländer zeigen, dass das 
TARGET2-System wie eine Art Umverteilungsmechanismus wirkt, indem auch ohne 
Zusammenbruch des Euros bzw. dem Austritt eines Mitgliedslandes reale ökonomische 
Anpassungskosten entstehen können. 
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1.1  Motivation 
The issue of intra-European imbalances has attracted a lot of interest in recent years. 
While the current account for the aggregated euro area has always been nearly balanced 
since the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, growing and 
persistent divergences have developed among several EMU countries. The reasons for 
the growing external imbalances represent two sides of the same coin and can be 
summarised as follows: On the one hand, Germany’s current account surplus in the last 
years was mainly driven by an exogenous increase in private savings and enhancing 
foreign demand for German exports, as well as labour market reforms and wage 
restraints (Kollmann et al. 2014). On the other hand, the decline of borrowing costs 
through the elimination of exchange rate risk and the perceived disappearance of 
country risk premia in the process of financial integration has led to capital flows into 
European periphery countries (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002; Jaumotte and 
Sodsriwiboon 2010; Lane and Pels 2012). This contributed to a boost in domestic 
demand with subsequent increases in domestic prices and unit labour costs, which led to 
real exchange rate appreciation and competitiveness losses, resulting in growing and 
persistent current account deficits and external liabilities (e.g. Arghyrou and Chortareas 
2008; Zemanek et al. 2010; Belke and Dreger 2013; Chen et al. 2013). 
Experiences from the financial crisis and the European debt and banking crisis suggest 
that external imbalances can raise the risk for macroeconomic stability. Blanchard and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2012) and Obstfeld (2012) point out that large external deficits raise the 
risk for sudden stops in capital flows and may lead to financial disruptions and spillover 
effects, especially in countries or regions (EMU) with extensive cross-border financial 
links. They argue that these potential risks may justify a preventive role for fiscal policy 
and prudential measures. Support for fiscal policy’s contribution to attenuate external 
imbalances comes from Lane (2010). As a lesson from the recent crisis, he argues that 
fiscal policy should not only stabilise the output cycle, but also respond to external 
imbalances, because of potential spillover-effects to macroeconomic and fiscal stability 
embedded in such imbalances. 
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Following the literature on the twin deficit hypothesis (e.g. Corsetti and Müller 2006; 
Kim and Roubini 2008; Kumhof and Laxton 2013a; Bouakez et al. 2014), the potential 
role of fiscal policy in facilitating external adjustments is emphasised in several 
empirical studies (e.g. Abbas et al. 2011; Abiad et al. 2011). The link between fiscal 
policy and external adjustment typically alludes to the goods market channel. A 
reduction in government spending decreases public demand for domestic and foreign 
goods, depreciates the real exchange rate through relative price changes and strengthens 
the trade balance. Vice versa, an increase in government expenditure would be 
necessary to reduce a trade balance surplus. 
However, especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis, fiscal positions of most 
EMU member countries have deteriorated substantially due to severe recessions and the 
increased government spending to mitigate the output losses. As a consequence, 
government budget constraints are very tight and the scope for fiscal policy as a 
stabilisation tool is extremely limited. As fiscal policy is the major macroeconomic 
policy instrument left with the individual member countries of EMU, this poses new 
und pressing challenges for the appropriate design of tax and expenditure policies. In 
the end, fiscal policy is expected to help attenuating excessive external fluctuations on 
the one hand, and ensuring sound public finances to minimise the risks of future crises, 
on the other hand. It is, hence, of particular interest to analyse the potential of fiscal 
policy not only to stabilise domestic activity, but also the ability to attenuate or prevent 
large external imbalances – particularly in times of budgetary stress. 
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1.2  Synopsis 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse the potential of fiscal policy to stabilise asymmetric 
shocks and macroeconomic fluctuations at the level of EMU member states, with a 
specific focus on external imbalances. For that reason, I make use of different small 
open economy models to investigate to what extent fiscal policy can contribute to 
attenuate and reduce external imbalances, stabilise domestic activity and increase 
household welfare. Within each model, I use different fiscal policy rules to account for 
alternative economic scenarios. This allows a broad discussion on how fiscal policy 
could stabilise economic activities in open economies. Chapter 5 relaxes the focus on 
the stabilisation potential of fiscal policy and deals with TARGET2 imbalances as a 
specific characteristic of external imbalances.1 
Chapter 2 investigates the dynamic macroeconomic responses to different shocks under 
alternative exchange rate regimes and analyses the stabilising potential of fiscal policy 
for current account imbalances in a small open economy. Based on a small open 
economy model in the spirit of Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Justiniano and Preston 
(2010), the distinction between two monetary regimes, i.e. an economy inside and 
outside of EMU, and the introduction of fiscal policy rules allow for an endogenous 
reaction of fiscal policy to changes in the current account under alternative monetary 
regimes. Within this approach, we examine how fiscal policy affects the adjustment of 
the current account and other macroeconomic variables to productivity and risk 
premium shocks. The contribution of this approach to existing literature is to directly 
link fiscal policy rules to external imbalances and analyse the stabilising properties of 
such a rule based fiscal policy for the current account. The dynamic simulations show 
that entry into EMU and the accompanying loss of an autonomous monetary policy 
makes (i) the economy more vulnerable to a productivity shock with higher variability 
of output, real exchange rate and current account in the short run and (ii) leads to higher 
persistence of the real exchange rate. On the contrary, for a risk premium shock, entry 
into EMU implies lower variability of most macroeconomic variables, but a higher 
persistence in the adjustment process of the current account. For both shocks, inside as 
                                                 
1 In the following section, I briefly summarise the content of each chapter, whereas a detailed discussion 
on how the different approaches contribute to the existing literature is delegated to the respective chapter. 
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well as outside of EMU, a fiscal response to the current account can help stabilising 
most of the macroeconomic variables, e.g. real exchange rate and the current account, 
but at the expense of higher output variability in the short run. Hence, fiscal policy faces 
a trade-off between stabilising current account and output. 
As large external imbalances and fragile fiscal positions have emerged as major policy 
challenges for the euro area in the financial crisis, Chapter 3 focuses on the question 
whether a shift of government expenditure between tradable and non-tradable goods is 
an alternative to a fiscal devaluation in order to support external adjustment. To my 
knowledge, this approach is the first to assess the stabilisation properties of changes in 
the composition of government purchases between tradables and non-tradables based on 
a simple fiscal policy rule. To take into account the current debate on fiscal devaluation 
(e.g. Correia 2011; Farhi et al. 2011; de Mooij and Keen 2013), we use a fiscal 
devaluation scenario, i.e. a shift of the tax burden from labour to consumption, as 
benchmark to evaluate the potential welfare and rebalancing effects of the expenditure-
shifting policy rule. The analytical framework is more extensive than in Chapter 2. 
Following the small open economy approach by Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Vogel 
et al. (2013), the two-region New Keynesian DSGE model with price and wage 
stickiness and financial market frictions is extended by a non-tradable goods sector and 
a relative fiscal policy rule that adjusts its expenditure between T/NT according to 
fluctuations in macroeconomic variables. This chapter finds that a state-dependent 
sectoral reallocation of government purchases can dampen excessive fluctuations in the 
external accounts. However, such a policy is accompanied with average welfare losses 
due to the trade-off between the stabilisation of external positions and domestic 
variables. The policy rule generates welfare gains if it targets the stabilisation of 
domestic output at the cost of amplified external fluctuations. In contrast, fiscal 
devaluation does not face such a trade-off between lower excess volatility in external 
positions and domestic variables. 
Chapter 4 builds upon the framework studied in Chapter 3, however, we broaden the 
analysis in a number of dimensions by (i) considering fiscal policy rules that adjust the 
composition of government purchases in response to domestic cyclical fluctuations, (ii) 
using a classical counter-cyclical policy rule as benchmark scenario, (iii) introducing 
sector-specific shocks in addition to economy-wide supply and demand shocks, (iv) 
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providing a more extensive welfare analysis by decomposing the overall welfare effects 
in mean and volatility effects and (v) using lump-sum taxes as alternative budget 
closure. The simulations in this chapter show that the expenditure-switching rule can 
achieve substantial welfare gains for the population average. Welfare gains are higher 
compared to a standard counter-cyclical policy rule that adjust the overall level 
government purchases. The reason is the combination of ex ante neutrality with a 
stabilisation of activity and tax revenues. The expenditure-switching rule therefore 
avoids offsetting effects from pro-cyclical budgetary closure rules that, e.g., increase tax 
rates in recessions in order to stabilise government deficit and debt levels. 
Relaxing the focus on the stabilisation potential of fiscal policy, Chapter 5 deals with 
TARGET2 imbalances within the euro area. Pioneered by Sinn and Wollmershäuser 
(2012a, 2012b), the discussion on TARGET2 imbalances – and its potential role of 
perpetuating current account imbalances – has attracted a lot of interest, especially since 
the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 and during the European debt and banking crisis. 
Due to the risks to macroeconomic and financial stability, the existing literature focuses 
mainly on potential risks and costs, which are associated with the TARGET2 system in 
case of a euro collapse or a member country’s exit of the EMU. The contribution of this 
chapter is to evaluate the current economic costs incurred from holding TARGET2 
claims in real terms. Although TARGET2 claims and liabilities are interest-bearing, 
nominal gains have to be adjusted by price level changes over time, i.e. by the real 
exchange rate, to account for real structural imbalances within the euro area. Based on a 
stylised two-period model according to Jin and Choi (2013), this chapter shows that at 
the end of 2013, Germany faces real losses in the amount of 13 billion euros. Moreover, 
the real gains and losses of the TARGET2 system can be considered an implicit 
distribution mechanism, which mirrors the real structural imbalances within the EMU. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a brief summary. 
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2.1  Introduction 
The issue of global imbalances has attracted a lot of interest and controversy in the last 
decade (e.g. Bernanke 2005; Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2012). On a regional level 
substantial imbalances within the euro area have developed and are now on the 
international policy agenda, not least due to the ongoing twin debt and banking crises. 
While the current account for the aggregated euro area is nearly balanced, a growing 
and persistent divergence has developed among EMU countries since the establishment 
of the monetary union in 1999 with considerable current account deficits particularly in 
some southern European countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (see Figure 1).  
The debate on these imbalances has so far mainly focused on the role of capital flows 
for real appreciation, the subsequent loss of competitiveness, and the deterioration of the 
current account (e.g. Arghyrou and Chortareas 2008; Zemanek et al. 2010; Schnabl and 
Freitag 2012; Belke and Dreger 2013). In an empirical investigation on the stationarity 
of current account deficits in the European Union, Holmes et al. (2010) find the strong 
evidence on deficit sustainability in the core EU members, while evidence is weaker for 
a large EU panel and a non-EU panel. This might suggest that subsequent EU 
expansions have weakened sustainability of current account deficits.  
Figure 1: Current account balances in the euro area (1990-2011) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators online database. 
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In the case of the large and persistent current account imbalances within the euro area 
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) argue that without the possibility of nominal 
exchange rate revaluation, gradual adjustment to regaining competitiveness is painful 
and sudden stops in capital flows might lead to abrupt adjustment with sharp 
contractions in domestic demand. They point out that especially in the current twin 
banking and debt crisis, fiscal consolidation will play crucial role in lower public debt, 
reducing domestic demand pressure and improving the current account deficit positions. 
To investigate the potential of fiscal policy to stabilise the current account, i.e. to 
prevent ex ante excessive imbalances, we use the link between current account and 
fiscal policy. This analysis typically alludes to the goods market channel with an 
increase in government spending raising the demand for domestic goods, appreciating 
the real exchange rate through relative price changes and thereby worsening the trade 
balance. While there is some controversy on the empirics of these effects, especially 
concerning the relationship between government spending, real exchange rate and 
current account deficit in the US (see Corsetti and Müller 2006; Chinn and Ito 2008; 
Kim and Roubini 2008; Monacelli and Perotti 2010; Bouakez et al. 2014), Abbas et al. 
(2011) report a statistically significant association between fiscal policy and the current 
account. Based on a large country sample of 124 countries over the period 1985 – 2007 
they find that an 1 percent increase in government consumption typically worsens the 
current account by about 0.3 percent of GDP on impact with this effect becoming 
insignificant after two to four years.2 In the context of the European Union, Beetsma et 
al. (2008) find for 14 EU countries over the period 1970 – 2004 that an increase in 
public spending of 1 percent of GDP raises GDP by 1.2 percent, which leads through a 
decrease in net exports to a fall of the trade balance by 0.5 percent of GDP. Catalán and 
Lama (2006) provide further support for the stabilisation potential of fiscal policy. They 
show for the Spanish economy that an 1 percent exogenous fall in real government 
spending improves the current account balance by about 0.16 percentage points of GDP 
over the first year. In a recent study on fiscal consolidation and its implications for the 
                                                 
2 The estimations yield similar results for emerging, low-income and advanced economies. The 
relationship is significantly stronger when output is above potential output. 
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current account Abiad et al. (2011)3 find that a fiscal consolidation of 1 percent of GDP 
results in an improvement in the current account of over 0.5 percent of GDP within two 
years. This effect is not only driven through a decline in domestic demand but also an 
increase in exports as a result of a real depreciation of the domestic currency. 
Figure 2 depicts exemplarily the development of government spending and current 
account balance for three current account deficit countries in the center of the ongoing 
financial crisis debate, namely Greece, Portugal and Spain. Typically an increase in 
government spending is accompanied by a decrease in the current account with a short 
delay. This could indicate that for small open economies with large current account 
deficits, fiscal policy could be an important policy instrument to stabilise the current 
account. 
Figure 2: Changes in current account and government spending 
 
Source: IHS Global Insight. Note: Changes are measured as deviations from HP-filter 
trend and for the group of Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
 
The DSGE approach provides a comprehensive framework to analyse fiscal and 
monetary policy under alternative exchange rate regimes, e.g. being a member of the 
                                                 
3 This chapter in the World Economic Outlook 2011 – Slowing Growth, Rising Risks – refers on the 
background paper by Bluedorn and Leigh (2011). 
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euro area or not. While the coordination and stabilising properties of monetary and 
fiscal policy are at the core of the extensive DSGE literature (e.g. Beetsma and Jensen 
2005; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2007; Ferrero 2009; Vogel et al. 2013), only few 
studies deal with the potential of monetary or fiscal policy for stabilising the current 
account. Ferrero et al. (2008) analyse the effects of alternative monetary policy regimes 
on the behavior of aggregate variables under two different current account rebalancing 
scenarios, but without considering fiscal policy rules. Di Giorgio and Nisticò (2013) 
study the role of stabilisation policies for productivity shocks on the dynamics of net 
foreign assets in a two country DSGE model with overlapping generations. In addition 
to alternative monetary policy rules, they use a primary-deficit feedback rule for fiscal 
policy with counter-cyclical response to the output gap and the stock of public debt. For 
a positive productivity shock they show how a low degree of fiscal discipline, i.e. the 
extent to which fiscal policy reacts to outstanding debt, leads to a deterioration of the 
net foreign asset position in the medium run.  
Our contribution to this line of research is to link fiscal policy rules directly to external 
imbalances and analyse the stabilising properties of such a rule based fiscal policy for 
the current account. As the ongoing current financial crisis reveals current account 
imbalances can cause far reaching damage to financial stability. As fiscal policy is the 
major policy instrument left with the individual members of a currency union it seems 
interesting and necessary to analyse the potential of fiscal policy rules to stabilise the 
current account. As an example the European Commission explicitly looks into the 
process of macroeconomic imbalances with her scoreboard framework (see European 
Commission 2012), so a better understanding of policy rules to stabilise the current 
account could be of particular interest. We find that inside as well as outside of EMU a 
fiscal response to the current account can help stabilising most of macroeconomic 
variables, e.g. real exchange rate, net foreign assets and the current account, but fiscal 
policy faces a trade-off between stabilising current account and output. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes a small open economy DSGE 
model. The design of our monetary and fiscal policy rules with respect to alternative 
monetary regimes and the model calibration are given in section 2.3. Section 2.4 
examines the simulation results of a negative productivity and risk premium shock to 
macroeconomic variables under alternative scenarios and policy rules, with focus on 
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current account dynamics. Section 2.5 provides some insights on the sensitivity of our 
results. Our main findings are summarised in section 2.6. 
 
2.2  A small open economy model 
Our model is based on the small open economy approach as in Monacelli (2005), Galí 
and Monacelli (2005) and Justiniano and Preston (2010). Within this framework, the 
small open economy is modelled as one among a continuum of small open economies 
that form a monetary union.4 Since each union member is infinitesimally small, country 
specific policies and shocks do not affect the rest of the monetary union, and is large 
enough to be characterised as a closed economy (see Monacelli 2005; Beltran and 
Draper 2008). The model includes elements that have become standard in this literature, 
such as nominal rigidities in price-setting, indexation of domestic prices to past 
inflation, incomplete pass-through of exchange rate movements to domestic inflation, 
habit formation in consumption and the use of Taylor rules in monetary policy. We 
depart from the assumption of complete risk-sharing as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2003) by introducing a country risk premium. This debt-elastic interest rate is related to 
the net foreign asset position. Hence, if the economy is a net borrower, domestic 
households are charged with a risk premium on the foreign interest rate. Due to the loss 
of an autonomous monetary policy within a currency union, we focus our analysis on 
the potential of alternative fiscal policy rules to stabilise the current account. 
 
Households 
The domestic economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely living households 
whose preferences are given by: 
 
( )1 1
0
0 1 1
t tt t
t
C H NE
σ ϕ
β σ ϕ
− +∞
=
⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥− +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ , (2.1) 
                                                 
4 For the alternative two country monetary union approach, see Benigno (2004), Beetsma and Jensen 
(2005), Breuss and Rabitsch (2008), and Ferrero (2009). 
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where tN  is labor input, 0 1β< <  is the discount factor and 1t tH hC −≡  describes the 
external habit formation of the household. The parameters , 0σ ϕ >  are the inverse 
elasticities of intertemporal substitution (or coefficient of relative risk aversion) and 
labor supply, respectively. tC  is a composite consumption index defined by 
 ( ) 1 1 1 11 , ,1t H t F tC C C
η
η η η
η η ηηα α
− − −⎡ ⎤≡ − +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. (2.2) 
,H tC  and ,F tC  are CES aggregators of the quantities of domestic and foreign goods: 
( ) 1 11, ,0H t H tC C i di
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  and ( )
1 11
, ,0F t F t
C C i di
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ,  (2.3) 
where 0η >  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The 
parameters α  and 1ε >  are the share of foreign-produced goods in the consumption 
bundle and the elasticity of substitution between types of differentiated domestic or 
foreign goods, respectively. 
The only available assets are domestic and foreign bonds. So that flow budget constraint 
of households is given by: 
 *
1 1 1 1 1 , ,(1 ) (1 ) ( )
t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t H t F t t
PC B e nfa
W N i B i nfa e nfa Tφ− − − − −
+ + =
+ + + + +Π +Π −  (2.4) 
The left hand side corresponds to the uses of the resources. Households can utilise these 
to consume goods or to purchase new bonds, where tB  is the amount of one-period 
domestic bonds and tnfa  the amount of one-period foreign currency denominated 
bonds. te  is the nominal exchange rate. The right hand side represents the resources at 
the beginning of period t , where t tW N  is the wage earning, ,H tΠ  and ,F tΠ  denote 
profits from holding shares in domestic and imported goods firms and tT  implies lump-
sum taxes. Following Benigno (2009) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), the term 
( )t tnfaφ is a premium on foreign bond holdings, defined as  
exp ( )t t tnfaφ χ φ⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦? , 
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where 
t t
t
t
e NFAnfa
P
≡  
is the real aggregate net foreign asset position of the domestic economy and tφ?  a risk 
premium shock. The function ( )t tnfaφ  captures the costs for domestic households of 
doing transactions in the international asset market. Hence, as net borrowers, domestic 
households are charged a premium on the foreign interest rate; as net lenders, they 
receive a remuneration lower than the foreign interest rate. This functional form ensures 
stationarity of the foreign debt level in a log-linear approximation to the model. 
For any given expenditure, the household optimisation problem yields the demand for 
each category of goods: 
( ) ( ),, ,
,
H t
H t H t
H t
P i
C i C
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 and ( ) ( ),, ,
,
F t
F t F t
F t
P i
C i C
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  (2.5) 
for all [ ]0,1i∈ , where the price indices of the domestic and foreign consumption 
bundles are 
( )
1
1 1 1
, ,0H t H t
P P i diε ε− −⎡ ⎤≡ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  and ( )
1
1 1 1
, ,0F t F t
P P i diε ε− −⎡ ⎤≡ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ . 
Assuming symmetry across all i  goods, the optimal allocation of expenditures between 
domestic and foreign goods implies the demand functions 
 ( ) ,, 1 H tH t t
t
P
C C
P
η
α
−⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (2.6) 
and 
 ,,
F t
F t t
t
P
C C
P
η
α
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (2.7) 
where the consumer price index (CPI) is defined as 
 ( ) 11 1 1, ,1t H t F tP P Pη η ηα α− − −⎡ ⎤≡ − +⎣ ⎦ . (2.8) 
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The following optimality conditions, derived by maximising equation (2.1) subject to 
the budget constraint (2.4), must hold in equilibrium: 
 ( )
t t
tt t
N W
PC H
ϕ
σ− =−  (2.9) 
 
( )
( )1 1 1
1
(1 )
t t t
t
t t t t
C H PE
C H P i
σ
β
−
+ +
+
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− +⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
, (2.10) 
 
( )
( )1 1 1 *1
1
(1 ) ( )
t t t t
t
t t t t t t
C H P eE
C H P e i nfa
σ
β φ
−
+ + +
+
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− +⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
. (2.11) 
Equation (2.9) gives us the first order condition of the consumer’s problem for making 
the intratemporal choice between labor and leisure. It states that the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and labor is equal to the real wage at any point of 
time. The intertemporal first order condition is given by equation (2.10), which is the 
standard Euler equation for the holding of domestic bonds. Similarly, equation (2.11) is 
the optimality condition for the holding of foreign bonds. 
 
Domestic Producers 
Differentiated domestic goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically 
competitive firms owned by consumers. Each firm produces with a linear technology 
represented by the production function ( ) ( )t t tY i A N i= , where tA  is an exogenous 
productivity shock. We further assume that firms set prices in a staggered fashion as in 
Calvo (1983). Hence, in any period t  only ( )1 Hθ−  firms are allowed to adjust their 
prices and maximise their expected discounted value of profits 
( ) ( ), , , , ,T tt H t T H T H t H T H T
T t
E Y i P i P MCθ β∞ −
=
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦∑  
subject to the demand function 
( ) ( ) ( ),, , ,
,
H T
H T H T H T
H T
P i
Y i C C
P
ε−
∗⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
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where , ,/H T T H TMC W P=  is the real marginal cost. T tHθ −  is the probability that the 
domestic firm will not be able to adjust its price during the next ( )T t−  periods.  
The first order condition is then 
 ( ) ( ), , , , , 01T t Ht H t T H T H T H T H TT t HE Y i P i P MC
θθ β θ
∞ −
=
⎡ ⎤− =⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦∑ . (2.12) 
 
Retail Firms 
For incomplete exchange rate pass-through we follow Monacelli (2005). Retail firms 
import foreign differentiated goods and have a small degree of pricing power because 
they are assumed to be monopolistically competitive. When selling imported goods to 
domestic consumers they will charge a mark-up over their cost. In the short run, this 
creates a wedge between the world market price of foreign goods paid by importing 
firms ( )*,t F te P  and the domestic currency price of these goods when they are sold to 
consumers ( ),F tP . The so called “law of one price (l.o.p.) gap” (Monacelli 2005) is 
defined as: 
 ,,
,
t F t
F t
F t
E P
P
∗
Ψ =  (2.13) 
Retail firms also operate under Calvo-style price setting, with Fθ  being the fraction of 
firms not allowed to set prices optimally in any period t . These maximise the expected 
stream of discounted profits 
( ) ( ), , , ,T tt F t T F T F t T F T
T t
E C i P i e Pθ β∞ − ∗
=
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦∑  
subject to the demand curve 
( ) ( ),, ,
,
F T
F T F T
F T
P i
C i C
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
The associated first order condition yields: 
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 ( ) ( ), , , , 01T t Ft F t T F T F T T F TT t FE C i P i e P
θθ β θ
∞ − ∗
=
⎡ ⎤− =⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦∑ . (2.14) 
 
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 
Because we depart from the assumption of complete risk-sharing and allow for 
incomplete asset markets, we derive the uncovered interest rate parity condition through 
the asset-pricing condition in equations (2.10) and (2.11), which determine domestic 
and foreign bond holdings: 
 * 1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) tt
t
ei i nfa
e
φ +⎡ ⎤+ = + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . (2.15) 
In periods when the economy is a net borrower (net lender), the domestic interest rate is 
higher (lower) than the foreign interest rate. Thus, movements in the net foreign asset 
position affect the interest rate differential of the domestic and foreign economy. 
 
Government 
To investigate the potential stabilising effects of fiscal policy to correct current account 
imbalances by regulating domestic demand, we assume that the government only 
purchases domestically-produced goods. The public consumption index is given by 
 ( ) 1 11, ,0H t H tG G i di
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  (2.16) 
where , ( )H tG i  is the quantity of domestic good i  purchased by government. For any 
given level of public consumption, the government allocates expenditures across goods 
in order to minimise total cost. Minimisation of H HP G  under restriction (2.16) yields the 
government demand function: 
 ( ) ( ),, ,
,
H t
H t H t
H t
P i
G i G
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. (2.17) 
 21 
 
Government spending is financed either through lump-sum taxes to domestic 
households tT  or by nominal debt denominated in local currency tB . This yields the 
government’s flow budget constraint, in nominal terms: 
 1 1 ,(1 )t t t H t tB i B G T− −= + + − , (2.18) 
where ,H t tG T−  denotes the nominal primary deficit (see Corsetti et al. 2009; Di Giorgio 
and Nisticò 2013). The detailed government spending feedback rules are defined in 
section 2.3. 
 
Terms of Trade, Real Exchange Rate and the Current Account 
Terms of trade are defined as 
 ,
,
F t
t
H t
P
S
P
= . (2.19) 
The domestic terms of trade is the price of foreign goods (imports) per unit of domestic 
goods (exports). An increase in tS  is therefore equivalent to an increase in 
competitiveness. The real exchange rate is defined as 
 
*
t t
t
t
e PQ
P
= , (2.20) 
the ratio of CPIs expressed in a common currency, where an increase in tQ  implies a 
depreciation of the home currency and thus an increase in competitiveness. 
Finally, real net foreign assets evolve according to 
 1 1 1
1
(1 )
(1 )
t t t t t
t t
t H t
e NFA i e NFA NX
P P
φπ
− − −
−
⎛ ⎞+= +⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠
, (2.21) 
where tNX  denotes net exports and is the difference between output and absorption: 
 , ( )H tt t t t
t
P
NX Y C G
P
= − + . (2.22) 
The current account reflects the change in real net foreign assets: 
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 1 1t t t tt
t
e NFA e NFACA
P
− −−= . (2.23) 
The derivation of the log-linear model is shown in appendix B, equations (2.35 – 2.53). 
Following Galí and Monacelli (2005), we assume a symmetric non-stochastic steady 
state with a zero net foreign asset position and a balanced current account 
( 0NFA CA= = ). This implies that relative prices are unity, i.e. purchasing power parity 
holds ( 1Q S= = ).  
 
Rest of monetary union 
We follow Monacelli (2005) and characterise the rest of the EMU by the closed-
economy version of the model above. It is assumed that preferences and technology are 
identical to those of the small economy. Furthermore, since the share of imported goods 
in the CPI basket is negligible small, CPI inflation equals domestic inflation and output 
equals consumption ( * *t tc y= ). The rest of the euro area can be fully described by the 
following dynamic equations: 
 ( ) ( ) { }( )* * * * * * *1 1 1 ,1 1t t t t t t t t pref ty hy E y hy h i E π εσ− + +− = − − − − −  (2.24) 
and 
 { }* * * *1 ,t t t F t tE mc ππ β π κ ε+= + +  (2.25) 
with 
 ( ) ( )1* * * * *11t t t tt tmc y s y hy ahσϕ α ϕ−= + + − − +−  (2.26) 
and *,tπε  is an exogenous shock to foreign inflation. The EMU monetary policy follows 
a Taylor-type rule, e.g.: 
 ( )* * * *ˆ* 1 * * * *,ˆ(1 )t i t i t y tt i ti i yπρ ρ ω π ω ε−= + − + + , (2.27) 
where *,i tε  is an exogenous monetary policy shock. 
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2.3  Monetary and fiscal policy rules 
Both, outside of and within a currency union the interaction of monetary and fiscal 
policies affects macroeconomic adjustments. Concerning the design of alternative 
monetary regimes and fiscal policy rules and their response to current account 
imbalances, we distinguish between (I) simple instrument rules and (II) optimal policy 
rules.5 The advantage of simple rules is that they are easy to implement and for the 
public to understand. In order to compare the simple rules with an optimal policy we 
study an optimal policy rule under discretion where government takes private 
expectations as given and re-optimises the policy each period. The instrument rules of 
our model are structured as follows: 
Before monetary union the monetary authorities of both countries act independently and 
are assumed to follow a Taylor-rule (Taylor 1993): 
 ˆ1 ,ˆ(1 )( )t i t i t y t i ti i yπρ ρ ω π ω ε−= + − + + , (2.28) 
where iρ  is the degree of interest rate smoothing and πω , yˆω  are relative weights on 
inflation and output gap respectively. The output gap ˆt t ty y y= −  is the difference 
between actual output and steady state output.6 The residual variable ,i tε  is an 
exogenous monetary policy shock. 
With the final stage of the European Monetary Union, the small open economy adopts 
the euro area currency with the corresponding loss of an autonomous monetary policy. 
Thus, the nominal exchange rate in our model is exogenous and the interest rate is set 
solely by the foreign central bank (2.27). Therefore, the nominal interest rate in the 
small open economy is defined by: 
 *t ti i risk= +  (2.29) 
Concerning fiscal policy, the governments’ real flow budget constraint is defined as: 
                                                 
5 According to Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson (2000, 2003), targeting rules determine the 
optimal policy responses given a set of objectives. It minimises the objective loss function that deviates 
from a target variable. 
6 Some theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy rules examines a feedback to output 
growth rather than to output gap (e.g. Walsh 2003; Stracca 2007; Choi and Wen 2010). We have checked 
both rules for robustness in section 2.5 yielding negligible differences for our further analysis. 
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 1 1(1 )t t H t tb i b gπ− −= + − + , (2.30) 
where ,/t t H tb B P=  is the real debt denominated in local currency. We assume that 
government spending tg  is determined by an endogenous fiscal policy rule, according 
to Taylor (2000):7  
 1 1 2 1 1 ,(1 )( ( ) )t g t g g t t b t ca t g tg g y y b caρ ρ ω ω ω ε− − − − −= + − − − − + + , (2.31) 
where gρ  is the degree of instrument smoothing and , ,g b caω ω ω  are relative weights for 
output growth, the stock of public debt, and the current account, respectively. The 
residual term ,g tε  is an exogenous fiscal policy shock. We use this enhanced feedback 
rule to investigate the dynamic implications of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool. The 
parameter gω  determines to which degree fiscal policy is used to stabilise output 
growth.8 The automatic stabiliser includes a 1-quarter delay for taking into account an 
implementation or reaction lag.9 To account for the aim of fiscal discipline we follow, 
e.g. Schmidt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), Colciago et al. (2008), Forni et al. (2009), and Di 
Giorgio and Nisticò (2013), and introduce the term 1b tbω − , which captures the degree to 
which the dynamics of public debt are of concern to the fiscal authorities.10 With this 
formulation we can not only ensure long-run debt sustainability but can also account for 
the European Stability and Growth Pact, namely that the debt ceilings are in practice not 
strictly binding due to a number of provisional clauses.11 
                                                 
7 This type of counter-cyclical fiscal policy feedback rule – without the response to the current account – 
is comparable with a primary deficit-rule, which has become increasingly popular to characterise 
discretionary fiscal policy in empirical literature (e.g. Galí et al. 2003; Favero and Monacelli 2005; Forni 
et al. 2009). 
8 The stabilisation of output growth, rather than output gap, is consistent with empirical evidence, that 
primary balance in OECD economies are more sensitive to output growth (see Fatás and Mihov 2009). 
9 This is in line with Kirsanova et al. (2007), whereas, e.g., Galí and Monacelli (2008), Ferrero (2009), 
and Di Giorgio and Nistico (2013) use contemporaneous feedback rules. 
10 With that introduction of “fiscal discipline” we focus on “passive” fiscal rules (in the sense of Leeper 
1991). This type of “Ricardian”-fiscal policy ensures that fiscal solvency is met at all times. A 
combination of an active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy produces internally stable adjustment 
dynamics. 
11 Canzoneri et al. (2006) use a similar approach to take into account the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
without explicitly implementing the three percent deficit ceiling. 
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To analyse the stabilisation potential of a current account stabilising fiscal policy, we 
introduce an additional feedback to lagged current account.12 The parameter caω  
measures the extent to which fiscal policy is used to stabilise current account 
imbalances. More specifically, if the home country runs a current account deficit, the 
fiscal authority should reduce government spending to increase net exports, thereby 
diminishing the external deficit. 
Considering (II), a targeting rule implies the use of all relevant available information in 
order to minimise a loss function over expected future deviations of the target variable 
from the target level (see Rudebusch and Svensson 1999). Following Galí and 
Monacelli (2005), Moons et al. (2007) and Svensson (2003), we consider an 
intertemporal loss function in quarter t : 
 
0
T
t t T
T
E Lβ∞ +
=
∑ , (2.32) 
with the period loss function 
 2 2 2 2ˆ ˆt t y t g t ca tL y g caπ λ λ λ= + + + , (2.33) 
where , ,y g caλ λ λ  are the weights on output growth, government spending, and current 
account, respectively. Following the optimal policy literature, we set the relative weight 
on output growth to 1yλ =  and account for costs of fiscal policy intervention by 
assigning gλ  to 0.2  (see Kirsanova et al. 2007; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2007; Galí 
and Monacelli 2008). We introduce the current account with a weight of 0.5caλ =  to 
account for the emergence of external imbalances in the loss function. 
As highlighted in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson (2003), when 1β → , 
the value of the intertemporal loss function approaches the infinite sum of unconditional 
means of the period loss function [ ]tE L . Hence, the intertemporal loss function can be 
interpreted as the unconditional mean of the period loss function, which equals the 
weighted sum of unconditional variances of the variables. As a result, we are able to 
                                                 
12 We also assume a 1-quarter delay for an implementation or reaction lag of one period. 
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measure the loss function by weighting inflation, output growth, current account and 
fiscal instrument variability in the following manner: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]ˆ ˆt t y t g t ca tE L Var Var y Var g Var caπ λ λ λ= + + + . (2.34) 
 
Calibration 
We parameterise the model on a quarterly frequency based on previous studies. The 
parameter values refer to empirical findings from the small open economy literature, 
most of them for the euro area (e.g. Galí and Monacelli 2005; Smets and Wouters 2002, 
2003, 2005; Ferrero 2009). The value for the discount factor 0.99β =  implies an 
annual return of about 4 percent in the steady state. The coefficient of relative risk 
aversion is set to 1.5σ =  and implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 2 / 3 , 
which determines the sensitivity of consumption growth to changes in the real interest 
rate.13 The parameter 4ϕ =  implies a labor supply elasticity of 1/ 0.25ϕ = , which is in 
the range of microeconomic estimates (e.g. Evers et al. 2008). The elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods equals 1.5η = . The value α  for the 
degree of openness is assumed to be 0.4, which roughly corresponds to the import/GDP 
ratio in small open euro area economies. The degree of habit persistence is set to 
0.7h = .14 Calvo price stickiness θ  is determined to 0.75, a value consistent with an 
average period of one year between price adjustments (see Altissimo et al. 2006). The 
share of government spending in GDP is set to 0.2govρ = , which is the average value 
for small EMU members countries. The annualised debt-elastic premium on foreign 
bond holdings is 0.01tχ = , which implies that a 1 percentage-point deterioration of the 
NFA-to-GDP position raises annualised borrowing rates by one basis point.15 The 
monetary policy parameters are based on standard Taylor-type rule estimations and 
commonly employed in the literature. The degree of interest rate smoothing is 
determined by the persistence value of 0.75iρ = . The feedback coefficients of inflation 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of the wide variance in the empirical estimates of CRRA, see Beltran (2007). 
14 Setting h=0 leads – for both shocks – to an expected higher amplitude in consumption on impact. The 
resulting lower current account variability does not have an impact on our main results (see also Table 6 
at appendix). 
15 An external risk premium of this magnitude has been recently estimated for Spain by Aspachs-Bracons 
and Rabanal (2010). 
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and output gap are set to 1.5πω =  and ˆ 0.125yω =  (corresponding to 0.5 for annual 
rates), respectively. 
Regarding fiscal policy, the automatic stabiliser, gω , is set to 0.4  in our instrument 
rules (see Moons et al. 2007).16 To ensure stability of debt accumulation process, the 
feedback on past debt takes the value 0.02bω =  (see Corsetti et al. 2009; Motta and 
Tirelli 2012). The parameter gρ  reflects the fiscal flexibility to adjust fiscal policy in 
the short-run. While empirical findings about fiscal smoothing ranges between 0.4 and 
0.9 (e.g. van Aarle et al. 2004; Corsetti et al. 2009), DSGE literature often sets fiscal 
rules without a smoothing parameter. Concerning the trade-off between flexibility of 
fiscal rules in DSGE models and empirical findings, we set the smoothing parameter to 
0.2gρ = , allowing for difficulties in changing government spending. Depending on the 
response coefficient caω , we distinguish between 0caω =  and 1.5caω = . An overview 
of the model calibration is given in Table 3 at the appendix. 
 
2.4  Policy rules and current account dynamics 
In this section we study the effects of different shocks on macroeconomic variables, 
especially the current account dynamics, under alternative monetary regimes and policy 
rules.17 Within the scenario, we distinguish between the effects of being outside and 
inside of the European Monetary Union.18 
Concerning the design of fiscal policy rules to correct current account imbalances, we 
analyse the following scenarios: (i) no active fiscal policy, 0tg = , (ii) a conventional 
fiscal policy without current account response, 0caω = , (iii) a current account 
stabilising fiscal policy as in equation (2.31) with 1.5caω = , (iv) a fiscal targeting rule, 
in which the fiscal authority chooses its policy parameters ,g caω ω  to minimise the loss 
function derived in equation (2.33). 
                                                 
16 Taylor (2000) has estimated the automatic stabiliser for the US economy to -0.5. 
17 Our computations are performed using DYNARE toolbox for Matlab (Adjemian et al. 2011). 
18 We use standard deviations to compare the efficiency of alternative policy rules (see Taylor 1993). 
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We concentrate our analysis on a negative productivity shock and a negative risk 
premium shock for the small open economy. Both kinds of shocks can be seen as main 
driving forces of the current account deficit countries within the euro area (see Belke 
and Dreger 2013). All shocks are assumed to be unanticipated (stochastic), to occur in 
period 0, and to be uncorrelated. 
 
2.4.1  The dynamic response to a negative productivity shock 
We assume that the productivity shock evolves as a stationary AR(1) process: 
1 ,t a t a ta aρ ε−= +  
with a persistence parameter 0.7aρ = .19 Table 1 gives an overview of the standard 
deviations of macroeconomic variables to a negative productivity shock under the four 
alternative fiscal policy rules in the non-EMU scenario. 
Table 1: Standard deviations for a negative productivity shock  
in the non-EMU scenario 
Variable Standard deviations in % (non-EMU scenario) 
Fiscal policy rule (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 
0tg =  
0.4gω =
0caω =  
0.4gω =
1.5caω =  
0.7gω =
1.33caω =  
Consumption 0.5119 0.5108 0.4919 0.4929 
Output growth 0.3431 0.3395 0.3467 0.3418 
Real exchange rate 0.3362 0.3399 0.2878 0.2955 
Government spending 0.0000 0.1186 0.7838 0.6768 
Inflation 0.3376 0.3394 0.3226 0.3256 
Interest Rate 0.2212 0.2225 0.2014 0.2045 
Net foreign assets 4.3998 4.4054 3.9594 4.0071 
Current account 0.6681 0.6750 0.5846 0.5984 
Comparing fiscal policy rules (i) and (ii), the simulations show that conventional fiscal 
policy (ii) can help stabilising output with marginal deteriorations for most other 
                                                 
19 Di Giorgio and Nisticò (2013) estimate the persistence value of 0.7 for the euro area using quarterly 
HP-filtered data on labor productivity for the period 1970:1 to 2005:4. Vogel et al. (2013) estimate the 
AR(1) process for labor productivity in 1999:1 to 2009:4 by using the percentage deviations in the small 
EMU-12 countries from the EMU-12 average and yields 0.92. 
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macroeconomic variables, e.g. real exchange rate and the current account. Due to the 
decline in output – caused by the negative productivity shock – an increase in 
government spending raises the demand for domestic goods, increases domestic 
inflation which induces among others a higher real exchange rate appreciation and 
worsens the current account.  
The most relevant findings arise by comparing fiscal rules (ii) and (iii). A fiscal 
response to the current account (iii) can stabilise the current account as well as most 
other macro variables. Due to the cyclical response of government spending to the 
current account, the stabilising effects are accompanied with a higher variability of the 
output, however. Hence, fiscal policy faces a trade-off between stabilising current 
account and output. The optimal fiscal policy (iv) shows similar results. In order to 
minimise the loss function (equation 33), fiscal policy chooses a higher relative 
response to output – compared to fiscal rule (iii) – and therefore achieves a better 
stabilising effect of output at the expense of higher standard deviations of other macro 
variables. Summing up, the stronger the government spending response to the current 
account, the higher the stabilising effects for the current account and most macro 
variables at the expense of higher output variability in the short run. 
Figure 3 illustrates these dynamic responses. A negative productivity shock raises 
marginal costs, which induces an increase in domestic inflation and a rise of nominal 
interest rate by monetary policy. As a result, the terms of trade improve and the real 
exchange rate appreciates, implying a worsening of international competitiveness. This 
contributes to a decline in output and a current account deficit over the trade channel. 
Furthermore, the current account deficit is aggravated via the accumulation of foreign 
debts and the households’ efforts to smooth consumption.20 
 
 
                                                 
20 These findings are in line with Ca’Zorzi and Rubaszek (2012). The analysis suggests that consumption 
smoothing and the removal of exchange rate risk has been one of the main driving forces for the current 
account divergence in the euro area.  
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Figure 3: Impulse responses for a negative productivity shock 
 in the non-EMU scenario 
 
Note: The solid line is the dynamic response of fiscal rule (ii); the dotted line shows 
the response of fiscal rule (iii). 
When fiscal policy reacts according to rule (ii), government raises spending in order to 
stabilise output.21 The discrepancies to scenario (iii) in which fiscal policy responds to 
the current account deficit are shown by the dotted lines in Figure 3. In order to reduce 
the current account deficit, government spending decreases. Therefore, fiscal policy can 
stabilise not only the real exchange rate and the current account, but also consumption 
and net foreign assets. A smaller increase of the nominal interest rate and an almost 
constant inflation decreases the real interest rate and stabilises consumption, 
accompanied with less accumulated foreign debts. These stabilising effects of macro 
variables are more efficient compared to fiscal policy rule (ii), but with a deterioration 
of the output in the short run. 
                                                 
21 For fiscal rule (i), the differences in magnitude of dynamic responses are negligible compared to fiscal 
rule (ii) – the solid lines in Figure 3 – and are therefore omitted for clarity reasons. 
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For a better insight on the trade-off between stabilising current account and output the 
policy makers face, we display loss surfaces for various combinations of fiscal policy 
parameters gω  and caω . Losses are calculated based on equation (2.34) for alternative 
combinations of fiscal reaction parameters gω  and caω  over the interval [-2;1] and  
[-0.5;3], respectively. Figure 4 displays the governments’ losses in case of a negative 
productivity shock in the non-EMU scenario.  
Figure 4: Loss surface for optimal fiscal rule (iv) 
 
The loss is minimised for the fiscal parameter combination of 1gω = −  and 1.75caω = . 
Furthermore, the loss surface reveals another interesting insight. We can see a relatively 
stable area with low loss variation for the combinations gω  and caω  in the interval  
[-1.5;0] and [1;2.5], respectively. This area exposes relative weights of the two fiscal 
policy parameters. Therefore, fiscal response to the current account should be a bit 
higher relatively to the fiscal response to output. Outside of the area, a more 
conventional fiscal rule (decrease in gω ) as well as a more current account stabilising 
fiscal rule (increase in caω ) leads to higher losses, because the former stabilises output 
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at the expense of higher variability of the current account and the latter stabilises the 
current account at the expense of higher output variability. 
In the next step we analyse the consequences for the small open economy when joining 
the EMU. Comparing the standard deviations of the macroeconomic variables in Table 
2, similar results as in the non-EMU scenario become evident. A fiscal response to the 
current account (iii) stabilises the current account as well as most other macro variables, 
but is accompanied with a higher variability of the output. Another interesting aspect is 
the increase in macroeconomic volatility that is associated with the EMU entry (see 
Tables 2 and 1). 
Table 2: Standard deviations for a negative productivity shock  
in the EMU scenario 
 
This increased vulnerability is confirmed by the dynamic responses in Figure 5, which 
show both, the dynamic responses for a negative productivity shock in the non-EMU 
scenario and the EMU scenario. Due to the loss of an autonomous monetary authority 
and the adoption of the euro, the nominal exchange rate is now exogenous for the small 
open economy. The small increase in the nominal interest rate is not induced by 
monetary policy, but via a positive risk premium, because the economy becomes a net 
borrower.  
Entry into EMU implies a higher variability and more persistence in the adjustment 
process of some macroeconomic variables, e.g. the real exchange rate. A more 
persistent appreciation and a decrease in competitiveness produce higher negative 
Variable Standard deviations in % (EMU scenario) 
Fiscal policy rule (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 
0tg =  
0.4gω =
0caω =  
0.4gω =
1.5caω =  
0.68gω =
1.24caω =  
Consumption 0.6210 0.6203 0.5965 0.5995 
Output growth 0.3667 0.3635 0.3774 0.3710 
Real exchange rate 0.4078 0.4113 0.3617 0.3715 
Government spending 0.0000 0.1268 0.8743 0.7058 
Inflation 0.2166 0.2191 0.2058 0.2095 
Interest Rate 0.0495 0.0496 0.0446 0.0454 
Net foreign assets 4.9476 4.9567 4.4635 4.5450 
Current account 0.7335 0.7409 0.6497 0.6687 
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output growth and higher current account deficits. As in the non-EMU scenario, 
stabilising the current account is accompanied with higher output variability. Although 
a current account stabilising fiscal policy plays an important role to reduce the 
variability of net foreign assets and the current account, it is not able to fully 
compensate the absence of an autonomous monetary policy. 
Figure 5: Impulse responses for a negative productivity shock  
in the EMU and non-EMU scenario 
 
Note: The solid and dotted lines are the dynamic responses of fiscal rules (ii) and (iii) of 
Figure 3 (non-EMU scenario) as a benchmark. The marked (*) solid and dotted 
lines show the effects of fiscal rule (ii) and (iii) in the EMU-scenario, respectively. 
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2.4.2  The dynamic response to a negative risk premium shock 
A specific development during the establishment of EMU was the sharp drop in long-
run interest rates, which was associated with a drastic decline of government bond 
spreads within the euro area (see Figure 8 in the appendix). We analyse such a negative 
risk premium shock, defined as a stationary AR(1) process: 
, 1 ,
risk
risk t risk t risk tε ρ ε −= +Φ , 
where riskρ  is set to 0.9  to accommodate the long persistence.22  
Figure 6 shows the dynamic responses corresponding to fiscal rules (ii) and (iii). Similar 
to negative productivity shock, we start analysing the dynamic responses in the non-
EMU scenario.23. A negative risk premium shock lowers nominal interest rates and 
induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The loss in competitiveness lowers 
output and the current account. A decrease in domestic inflation, caused by lower 
marginal costs, reduces the real interest rate and raises consumption. Due to the 
decrease in output, conventional fiscal policy (solid line) increase government spending 
in order to stabilise output. A current account stabilising fiscal rule (dotted line) 
decreases government spending and reduces the variability of real exchange rate and 
current account deficit. Analogously to the productivity shock, the stabilising effects for 
the current account are accompanied by a higher variability of output.  
In a next step we analyse the effects when the small open economy is inside the EMU. 
Considering only the stabilising effects for fiscal rules (ii) and (iii) in the EMU scenario 
(*-marked lines in Figure 7), similar results as for the non-EMU scenario become 
evident. Hence, a fiscal response to the current account (*-dotted lines) stabilises the 
current account and real exchange rate, but is accompanied with higher variability of the 
output.  
 
                                                 
22 The negative risk premium shock affects the interest rate on foreign bond holdings and can also be 
interpreted as a preference shock on foreign assets. 
23 The standard deviations for the risk premium shock in the non-EMU and EMU scenario can be found 
in Table 4 and 5 at the appendix. 
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Figure 6: Impulse responses for a negative risk premium shock  
in the non-EMU scenario 
 
Note: The solid line is the dynamic response of conventional fiscal rule (ii); the 
dotted line shows the current account stabilising fiscal rule (iii). 
 
Comparing the dynamic responses for both scenarios, the EMU scenario reveals 
remarkable effects for the variability of macroeconomics variables that are contrary to 
those for the negative productivity shock. Therefore, entry into EMU diminishes the 
volatility for most macroeconomic variables, especially in the first four quarters. This is 
due to the absence of nominal exchange rate fluctuations. In the non-EMU scenario, 
nominal exchange rate appreciates rapidly of about 3% and remains almost at the higher 
level. This leads to a stronger appreciation of the real exchange rate and a more drastic 
decline in output which worsens the current account. Due to the loss of monetary policy 
in the EMU scenario, nominal interest rate is more affected by a negative risk premium 
shock. Therefore, the increase in consumption variability is caused by a sharp decrease 
in the real interest rate. 
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Figure 7: Impulse responses for a negative risk premium shock  
in the EMU and non-EMU scenario 
 
Note: The solid and dotted lines are the dynamic responses of fiscal rules (ii) and (iii) of 
Figure 6 (non-EMU scenario) as a benchmark. The marked (*) solid and dotted lines 
show the effects of fiscal rule (ii) and (iii) in the EMU-scenario, respectively. 
Comparing the stabilising properties of alternative fiscal policy rules, similar results as 
for the negative productivity shock become evident. A counter-cyclical fiscal response 
to the current account stabilises most macroeconomic variables better than a 
conventional counter-cyclical response to output, independently of the underlying 
exchange rate regime. But, stabilising the current account via fiscal policy intervention 
is accompanied by higher variability of output. Furthermore, on the contrary to the 
productivity shock, entry into EMU implies lower variability of most macroeconomic 
variables, e.g. output, real exchange rate, current account, but a higher persistence in the 
adjustment process of the current account. The higher variability in the first four 
quarters of the non-EMU scenario is due to the high and persistent nominal exchange 
rate appreciation which leads to a higher real exchange rate appreciation. The decrease 
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in competitiveness produces higher negative output growth and higher current account 
deficits.  
 
2.5  Sensitivity Analysis 
For a better insight on the sensitivity of our empirical results, we do a comprehensive 
sensitivity analysis to evaluate the effect of alternative parameter settings (Table 6 at 
appendix). The simulations for alternative values of important parameter, e.g. the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, η , the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, σ , as well as the degree of habit formation, h , and 
openness, α , indicate that our main results are robust for both monetary regimes, 
shocks, and fiscal rules – the conventional (ii) and the current account stabilising fiscal 
rule (iii). Hence, a fiscal response to the current account can help stabilising most of 
macroeconomic variables, e.g. real exchange rate and the current account, but at the 
expense of higher output variability.  
Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis provides interesting insights into the amplitude and 
variability of the macroeconomic variables.24 Compared to the results of the baseline 
calibration (first column in Table 6), the smaller η  the smaller the domestic reaction to 
relative price changes and hence the smaller the variability of the current account and 
output. A smaller CRRA parameter σ  (i.e. the higher elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution) points in the same direction due to the fact that the current account deficit 
is alleviated via the accumulation of foreign debts through the households’ smaller 
efforts to smooth consumption. The analysis for the openness parameter shows that the 
more open the economy the higher the variability of the current account, but the smaller 
the amplitude of the domestic internal variables.  
 
                                                 
24 Since we are interested in the sensitivity of the main macroeconomic variables, we focus on 
consumption, output, real exchange rate, government spending and the current account. Furthermore, we 
can omit the variables inflation and interest rate due to the co movement with the real exchange rate, and 
the net foreign asset position due to the current account, respectively. 
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2.6  Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the stabilising potential of fiscal policy for current account 
imbalances in a small open economy. Examining two monetary regimes, i.e. an 
economy inside and outside of EMU, we introduce alternative fiscal policy rules to 
allow for an endogenous reaction of fiscal policy to changes in the current account. 
Within this approach, we analyse how fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool affects the 
adjustment of the current account and other macroeconomic variables to productivity 
and risk premium shocks. 
We find that the entry into the EMU and the accompanying loss of an autonomous 
monetary policy makes the economy more vulnerable to a productivity shock with 
higher variability of output, real exchange rate and current account in the short run and 
higher persistence of the real exchange rate. On the contrary, for a risk premium shock, 
entry into EMU implies lower variability of most macroeconomic variables, e.g. output, 
real exchange rate, current account, but a higher persistence in the adjustment process of 
the current account. For both shocks, inside as well as outside of EMU a fiscal response 
to the current account can help stabilising most of macroeconomic variables, e.g. real 
exchange rate, net foreign assets and the current account, but at the expense of higher 
output variability in the short run. Hence, fiscal policy faces a trade-off between 
stabilising current account and output. 
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2.7  Appendix 
2.7.1  Figures and Tables 
 
Table 3: Calibration 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Discount factor β  0.99 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion / Invers of 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
σ  1.5 
Elasticity of labor supply  1/ϕ  0.25 
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods 
η  1.5 
Degree of openness α  0.4 
Habit persistence h  0.7 
Calvo price stickiness θ  0.75 
Government spending share in GDP govρ  0.2 
Annualised debt elasticity of interest rate χ  0.01 
Interest rate smoothing iρ  0.75 
Feedback coefficients of inflation  πω  1.5 
Feedback coefficients of output gap yˆω  0.125 
Government instrument smoothing gρ  0.2 
Automatic stabiliser  gω  0.4 
Debt elasticity of government spending bω  0.02 
 
 
 
 
 40 
 
Table 4: Standard deviations for a negative risk premium shock 
 in the non-EMU scenario 
 
 
Table 5: Standard deviations for a negative risk premium shock 
 in the EMU scenario 
 
Variable Standard deviations in % (non-EMU scenario) 
Fiscal policy rule (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 0tg =  
0.4gω =
0caω =  
0.4gω =
1.5caω =  
1.00gω =
1.52caω =  
Consumption 3.0557 3.0595 3.7567 3.7674 
Output growth 3.3982 3.3703 3.6679 3.6203 
Real exchange rate 3.9081 3.9155 3.4617 3.4718 
Government spending 0.0000 0.9861 8.4664 8.4101 
Inflation 1.2526 1.2454 1.4204 1.4115 
Interest Rate 1.3753 1.3731 1.6281 1.6267 
Net foreign assets 74.2345 74.1871 68.6447 68.5366 
Current account 6.9018 6.9129 6.1493 6.1635 
Variable Standard deviations in % (EMU scenario) 
Fiscal policy rule (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 0tg =  
0.4gω =
0caω =  
0.4gω =
1.5caω =  
1.78gω =
2.54caω =  
Consumption 4.3901 4.3895 4.9343 5.2537 
Output growth 0.7406 0.7388 1.1783 1.4234 
Real exchange rate 1.9046 1.9056 1.5055 1.2958 
Government spending 0.0000 0.0713 6.7336 10.4458 
Inflation 0.5549 0.5562 0.4842 0.4533 
Interest Rate 1.9834 1.9687 1.9969 2.0123 
Net foreign assets 65.2263 65.2210 60.4933 57.7807 
Current account 5.2359 5.2375 4.6022 4.2684 
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Table 6: Sensitivity analysis for various parameter settings 
 
 
Variable 
Parameter 
Standard deviations of a negative productivity shock in % (non-
EMU scenario) 
 Conventional fiscal policy rule (ii) 
 Baseline 0.5η =  0.5σ =  0h =  0.6α =  
Consumption 0.5108 0.5640 0.8378 0.5885 0.4764 
Output growth 0.3395 0.2163 0.3703 0.3953 0.3273 
Real exchange rate 0.3399 0.6056 0.2939 0.3161 0.1375 
Gov. spending 0.1186 0.0763 0.1300 0.1358 0.1160 
Current account 0.6750 0.5309 0.5113 0.5605 0.7657 
 Current account stabilising fiscal policy rule (iii) 
 Baseline 0.5η =  0.5σ =  0h =  0.6α =  
Consumption 0.4919 0.5391 0.8022 0.5593 0.4639 
Output growth 0.3467 0.2342 0.3781 0.3898 0.3397 
Real exchange rate 0.2878 0.5348 0.2609 0.2740 0.1029 
Gov. spending 0.7838 0.6314 0.5748 0.6717 0.8831 
Current account 0.5846 0.4719 0.4614 0.4929 0.6473 
 (EMU scenario) 
 Current account stabilising fiscal policy rule (iii) 
 Baseline 0.5η =  0.5σ =  0h =  0.6α =
Consumption 0.5965 0.6229 0.9740 0.6686 0.6065 
Output growth 0.3774 0.2256 0.4175 0.4304 0.4230 
Real exchange rate 0.3617 0.5761 0.3354 0.3458 0.2116 
Gov. spending 0.8743 0.6552 0.6375 0.7370 1.0516 
Current account 0.6497 0.4830 0.5131 0.5400 0.7776 
  
 Standard deviations of a negative risk premium shock in % (EMU scenario) 
 Conventional fiscal policy rule (ii) 
 Baseline 0.5η =  0.5σ =  0h =  0.6α =  
Consumption 4.3895 3.9455 8.7766 5.5523 4.6511 
Output growth 0.7388 0.4095 0.6850 1.1087 1.0791 
Real exchange rate 1.9056 3.3755 2.5415 1.9540 0.8583 
Gov. spending 0.0713 0.0709 0.1402 0.3314 0.1316 
Current account 5.2375 4.7103 7.9092 5.6133 5.8011 
 Current account stabilising fiscal policy rule (iii) 
 Baseline 0.5η =  0.5σ =  0h =  0.6α =  
Consumption 4.9343 4.5262 10.1947 6.1207 5.2024 
Output growth 1.1783 0.5826 0.6806 1.5340 1.5323 
Real exchange rate 1.5055 2.7123 1.9933 1.5475 0.6066 
Gov. Spending 6.7336 6.1875 10.6861 7.2453 7.2955 
Current account 4.6022 4.2299 7.2729 5.0282 4.9860 
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Figure 8: 10-year government bond spreads 
 
Source: IHS Global Insight. 
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2.7.2  Log‐linear model 
The model is log-linearised around a non-stochastic steady state, so that variables are 
expressed in percent deviations from their respected steady state value. A log-linear 
approximation of the domestic household’s Euler equation (2.10) gives 
 ( ) ( ) { }( )1 1 11 1t t t t t t t t prefc hc E c hc h i E π εσ− + +− = − − − − − . (2.35) 
In the absence of habit formation – by setting 0h =  – one obtains the standard Euler 
equation.  
The market clearing condition implies that the economy’s output can either be 
consumed domestically or exported to the foreign country, therefore we can write: 
 , ,(1 )(1 )t gov H t F t gov ty c c gρ α α ρ= − − + +   (2.36) 
By using the log-linearised versions of the two demand functions (2.6) and (2.7) 
, ,( )H t H t t tc p p cη= − − +  and *, ,( )F t F t t tc p p cη= − − + , the CPI definition (2.8) 
, ,(1 )t H t F tp p pα α= − + , and the terms of trade definition (2.19) , ,t F t H ts p p= − , we can 
derive the following goods market clearing condition 
 *(1 )(1 )( ) ( ( ) )t gov t t t t t gov ty c s s c gρ α αη α η ψ ρ= − − + + + + + , (2.37) 
where *, ,( )F t t t F te p pψ = + −  denotes the law of one price gap. Notice that for a large 
foreign economy, output equals domestic consumption * *t tc y= . 
First order condition (2.12) implies the log-linear equation for newly set prices: 
 ( ) ( ), ,(1 ) T tnewH t H t H t H t
T t
p E mc pβθ βθ
−∞
=
⎡ ⎤= − +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ . (2.38) 
The evolution of the domestic aggregate price index is given by 
 ( ) ( )( ) 111 1, , 1 ,1 newH t H H t H H tP P P εε εθ θ −− −−⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . (2.39) 
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Combining (2.38) with the log-linearised version of (2.39) yields the forward-looking 
Phillips curve relating domestic inflation and real marginal cost:25 
 { }, , 1 ,HH t t H t H t tE mc ππ β π κ ε+= + + , (2.40) 
where (1 )(1 )H HH
H
θ βθκ θ
⎛ ⎞− −≡ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 and ,H tπε  is an exogenous AR(1) shock to domestic 
inflation. 
Differentiating the real total cost 
,
t t
t
H t t
W YTC
P A
=  w.r.t. tY  gives the real marginal cost in 
logs: 
 ,( )t t H t tmc w p a= − − . (2.41) 
The log-linearised intratemporal labor/leisure choice (2.9) is given by: 
 ( )( ) 11t tt t t
c hc
w p n
h
σ ϕ−−− = +− . (2.42) 
Combining equations (2.41) and (2.42), the production function in logs t t ty a n= + , and 
the Terms of Trade definition, we can derive the equilibrium condition for the domestic 
real marginal cost: 
 ( ) ( )1 11t t t t t tmc y s c hc ah
σϕ α ϕ−= + + − − +− . (2.43) 
Similarly, foreign goods price inflation follows a forward-looking Phillips curve and is 
given by: 
 { }, , 1 , ,FF t t F t F F t tE ππ β π κ ψ ε+= + + , (2.44) 
where (1 )(1 )F FF
F
θ βθκ θ
⎛ ⎞− −= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, ,F tψ  is the law of one price gap and ,F tπε  is an 
exogenous AR(1) shock to imported goods inflation. 
The domestic consumer price index (2.8) in log-linear form is therefore defined as: 
                                                 
25 For a detailed derivation see the appendix in Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
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 ( ) , ,1t H t F tπ α π απ= − + . (2.45) 
The change in the Terms of Trade (2.19) can be expressed in terms of the relative 
inflation rates between foreign goods and domestic goods: 
 , ,t F t H ts π π= −? . (2.46) 
By combining the real exchange rate (2.20) with the l.o.p. gap, the log real exchange 
rate can be expressed as: 
 , (1 )t F t tq sψ α= + − , (2.47) 
where the log terms of trade is defined as , ,t F t H ts p p= − . Equation (2.47) shows that 
the real exchange rate is positively related to both, the l.o.p. gap and Terms of Trade. 
Time differencing the real exchange rate yields the relationship between real and 
nominal depreciation rates as follows: 
 *1t t t t tq q e π π−− = + −? . (2.48) 
The uncovered interest parity condition (2.15), expressed in logs, becomes 
 { }* 1t t t t ti i E eφ +− − = ?  (2.49) 
with  
 ,t t risk tnfaφ χ ε= − − . (2.50) 
Equation (2.39) captures a time-varying country risk premium and is the sum of the net 
foreign asset position of the domestic country and an exogenous component ,risk tε , 
which follows an AR(1) process. The term χ  is an elasticity parameter negatively 
related to the net foreign asset position. The UIP can also be written as: 
 { }( ) { }( ) { }* *1 1 1t t t t t t t t ti E i E E qπ π φ+ + +− − − − = ?  (2.51) 
and implies that expected changes in real exchange rate are determined by current real 
interest rate differentials. 
The real net foreign asset position, equation (2.21) and (2.22), evolves over time 
according to 
 46 
 
 1 1 1(1 )t t H t tnfa i nfa nxπ φ− − −= + − +  (2.52) 
with ,(1 ) (1 ) ( )t gov t gov t F t gov tnx y c s gρ ρ α ψ ρ= − − − − + −  and t tt
t
e NFAnfa
P
= . 
Given the evolution of assets determined by the model, we may express the current 
account as the change in net foreign assets: 
 1t t tca nfa nfa −= − . (2.53) 
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3.1  Introduction 
Large external imbalances and fragile fiscal positions have emerged as major policy 
challenges for the euro area in the ongoing financial crisis. The vast external deficits of 
some member countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) have been associated 
with alarming instabilities in their banking and financial sectors. As fiscal policy is the 
only macroeconomic stabilisation instrument left with the individual member countries 
of EMU, it comes as no surprise that the euro area crisis has provoked extensive 
discussions on the appropriate design of fiscal policy. In addition, the fiscal position of 
most EMU member countries has deteriorated substantially in the aftermath of the crisis 
due to the severe output losses and the increased government spending to mitigate the 
recession. As a consequence, government budget constraints are very tight and the 
scope for fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool is extremely limited. Ultimately, fiscal 
policy is expected to both help attenuate excessive external fluctuations and safeguard 
public finances to minimise the risks of future crises. 
This poses new and pressing challenges for the design of tax and expenditure policies. 
In this situation, fiscal devaluation has been discussed as a budgetary-neutral 
stabilisation policy with focus on the revenue side. In particular a shift of the tax burden 
from labour taxes or social security contributions to consumption taxes, e.g. the VAT, 
has been advocated to mimic nominal exchange rate depreciation in a fixed exchange 
rate regime/currency union, in order to restore competitiveness of countries with large 
and persistent external deficits (e.g. Correia 2011; Farhi et al. 2011; de Mooij and Keen 
2013; ECB 2012; Engler et al. 2013).  
As an alternative to fiscal devaluation, this approach focuses in an analogous way on the 
expenditure side of fiscal policy, namely a state-dependent reallocation of government 
purchases from tradable (T) to non-tradable (NT) goods. Accounting for budgetary 
restrictions we analyse to what extent a budgetary-neutral government expenditure-shift 
between T and NT goods can reduce excessive external fluctuations that emerge from 
the combination of structural distortions/rigidities and country-specific shocks. The 
chapter also analyses the welfare effects of alternative policy rules in the context of a 
standard assessment of household welfare. 
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Adao et al. (2010) show that a combinations of fiscal measures can fully stabilise 
shocks even in an environment with price and wage stickiness and replicate the flexible 
economy solution and the adjustment dynamics under flexible nominal exchange rates. 
Perfect stabilisation, however, requires that governments are fully informed, including 
the ability to distinguish between the various supply and demand shocks in real time, 
and implement the full commitment solution to manage the expectation of households 
and firms. Our approach is more modest with respect to the potential role of fiscal 
policy. We focus on one instrument combination at one time (tradable versus non-
tradable goods’ purchases, consumption versus labour tax) and on simple policy rules 
including an indicator of domestic activity or external imbalances. Simple policy rules 
mitigate the problem of limited information by focusing on standard indicators and the 
commitment problem by making commitment to the rule easier to observe. 
Commitment to the policy rule comes at the cost of a uniform response to different 
shocks that might trigger a differentiated response in the fully optimal policy case. 
The analytical framework is a two-region New Keynesian DSGE model with tradable 
(T) and non-tradable (NT) goods sectors, price and wage stickiness and financial market 
frictions. Our framework follows the small open economy approach by Galí and 
Monacelli (2008) and Vogel et al. (2013). Small member countries of monetary union 
have negligible impact on EMU-wide policies and tend to be more exposed to 
asymmetric shocks because of higher openness and specialisation. In the model, focus 
on a small member country in monetary union excludes feedback to monetary policy 
and the rest of monetary union. This set-up is obviously equivalent to a small open 
economy that pegs the exchange rate of her anchor currency thereby mimicking the 
anchor country’s monetary policy, e.g. in a currency board framework. 
To our knowledge, this approach is the first to assess the stabilisation properties of 
changing the composition in government purchases in the sense of state-dependent 
shifts between T and NT goods based on a simple fiscal instrument rule. As mentioned 
above this analysis is related to the current debate on revenue-neutral fiscal devaluation 
which focuses on the revenue side of fiscal policy (Correia 2011; Farhi et al. 2011; de 
Mooij and Keen 2013; ECB 2012; Engler et al. 2013).  
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Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007) and Engler et al. (2009) analyse the effects of 
expenditure switching from tradable to non-tradable goods on the U.S. current account 
deficit. However, they take a longer term perspective and examine the change in the real 
exchange rate necessary to structurally reduce the U.S. current account deficit. In 
contrast, we focus on reducing trade balance volatility by state-dependent fiscal policy 
that changes the composition of government purchases under the restriction of 
budgetary neutrality.  
Following the literature on the twin deficit hypothesis (e.g. Corsetti and Müller 2006; 
Kim and Roubini 2008; Kumhof and Laxton 2013a), we motivate the analysis of fiscal 
instrument rules reacting to external account variables by building on empirical studies 
that emphasise the role of fiscal policy in facilitating external adjustments (e.g. Abbas et 
al. 2011; Abiad et al. 2011). Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) show that an increase in 
financial integration, which is characteristic for monetary union, has disciplinary effects 
on fiscal policy as measured by the budget balance and dampens the volatility of 
government spending. A budgetary-neutral expenditure-composition rule as analysed in 
this chapter is compatible with both observations as it does not lead to large fluctuations 
in the government balance or the overall level of government expenditure. 
As a lesson to be drawn from the financial crisis, Lane (2010) argues that the 
stabilisation role of fiscal policy should not only relate to the output cycle, but also 
respond to external imbalances, because of potential spillover-effects to macroeconomic 
and fiscal stability embedded in such imbalances. These potential risks can motivate 
precautionary operations and may justify a preventive role for fiscal policy to limit the 
scale of external imbalances. Herz and Hohberger (2013) show in a two-country DSGE 
model that a counter-cyclical fiscal response to the current account can help stabilising 
external variables (e.g. real exchange rate and current account) at the expense of higher 
output variability, however. 
The main findings from the analysis are that a state-dependent sectoral reallocation of 
government purchases between tradables and non-tradables can dampen excessive 
fluctuations in the external accounts. However, such a policy is accompanied with 
average welfare losses of up to 0.6% within the parameter space considered due to the 
trade-off between the stabilisation of external positions and domestic variables under 
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this policy rule. The policy rule generates welfare gains of up to 1% of steady-state 
consumption for the average household if it targets the stabilisation of domestic output 
at the cost of amplified external fluctuations. Fiscal devaluation as an alternative policy 
does not face such a trade-off between lower excess volatility in external positions and 
domestic variables, so that a tax-shift policy reducing excessive swings in the trade 
balance is compatible with average welfare gains of up to 0.6% for the average 
household within the parameter space considered. 
 
3.2  Model 
The analytical framework is in the spirit of Galí and Monacelli (2008) who discuss 
optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union of small open economies. 
Specifically, our model is based on Vogel et al. (2013) who investigate the potential of 
simple fiscal policy rules to stabilise cyclical fluctuations in monetary union. They 
extend the Galí/Monacelli model to allow for a larger variety of policy instruments 
(government purchases, transfers, taxes), introduce physical capital and include 
additional frictions (wage stickiness, financial frictions, and capital adjustment costs). 
We augment this model by adding a non-tradable goods sector, so that our model 
consists of two regions, i.e. a small (domestic) member country of monetary union and 
the (foreign) rest of monetary union, and of two sectors, i.e. tradable (T) and non-
tradable (NT) goods sectors.26 The model includes monopolistic competition in goods 
and labour markets, nominal price and wage stickiness, liquidity constraints, capital and 
labour as inputs into production, and a set of fiscal variables that allow to change the 
composition of government spending in T and NT goods. Households are either 
intertemporal optimising consumers (NLC), i.e. households that can freely borrow and 
save to smooth consumption over time, or liquidity-constrained (LC) households, i.e. 
households without access to financial markets who consume their entire current 
disposable wage and transfer income in each period. The introduction of LC households 
can account for the positive correlation between private and government consumption at 
                                                 
26 Rabanal and Tuesta (2013) show that the distinction between tradable and non-tradable goods is 
important to understand real exchange rate fluctuations and that non-tradable technology shocks explain 
about one third of real exchange rate volatility. 
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business cycle frequencies (Galí et al. 2007). In light of the empirical evidence 
(Kollmann 1996) we depart from the assumption of complete risk-sharing as in Beetsma 
and Jensen (2004), Ferrero (2009), Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Kirsanova et al. 
(2007) and introduce a debt-dependent country risk premium (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
2003) as external closure. Goods markets are imperfectly integrated across borders in 
the sense that there is home bias in the demand for goods. Labour is immobile between 
countries. The rest of euro area (RoEA) variables and monetary policy are exogenously 
given from the perspective of the small economy.27 
 
Households 
The household sector consists of a continuum of households i. The welfare of household 
i is the discounted sum of the period utilities: 
 1 10
0
1 ( ) ( )
1 1
t i i
t t
t
E C Lσ ϕκβ σ ϕ
∞ − +
=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠∑  (3.1) 
Household utility is additive in private consumption itC  and work 
i
tL . The parameters β, 
1/σ, κ and 1/φ are the discount factor, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the 
disutility weight work, and the elasticity of labour supply. The benchmark model 
assumes log consumption utility, i.e. σ=1. The households decide about private 
consumption and labour supply given their respective budget constraints. 
NLC households, who are a fraction 1-slc of the population, make optimal intertemporal 
choices given their intertemporal budget constraint: 
 
*
, 1* *
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
* , 2
1 ,
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
4
(1 ) / 2( )
H tw i i r k k i
t t t t t t t t t t t tY
t t
k C i c C NLC C i w i C
t t t t t t t t t t H t w t t t
B
W L i B i B TR i K
P Y
P K PR P C P I B B P L
τ ω ε τ
τ δ τ γ π
−
− − − − −
− −
−
⎛ ⎞− + + + + − + + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
+ + = + + + + +
 (3.2) 
                                                 
27 The small-country setting differs from other research that has focused on fiscal policy in monetary 
unions of two large/symmetric countries (e.g. Beetsma and Jensen 2004; Kirsanova et al. 2007; Ferrero 
2009). 
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The revenue side includes the nominal wage income i it tW L  net of the (linear) labour 
income tax wtτ , the payment on maturing one-period domestic government bonds 1tB −  
including interest 1ti − , the repayment of one-period net foreign assets
*
, 1H tB −  including 
interest, which is the sum of the foreign rate * 1ti − , the endogenous part of the risk 
premium * , 1 1 1/ (4 )
Y
H t t tB P Yω − − −−  and the exogenous component rtε , lump-sum transfers 
from the government tTR , the return to capital 1 1(1 )
k k i k C i
t t t t t ti K P Kτ τ δ− −− +  net of capital 
taxes ktτ  and depreciation allowances ktτ δ , where , ,i i it T t NT tK K K≡ + , and profit income 
tPR  from firm ownership. The expenditure side combines nominal consumption 
C NLC
t tP C  taxed at rate
c
tτ , where CtP  is the consumer price index (CPI), nominal 
investment in the tradable and non-tradable sector C it tP I , where , ,
i i i
t T t NT tI I I≡ + , 
financial investment in domestic bonds and (net) foreign assets, and quadratic costs wγ  
of wage adjustment ( , 1/ 1
w i i i
t t tW Wπ −≡ − ). 
The accumulation of physical capital in the tradable and non-tradable goods sector 
follows the law of motion: 
 
2
,
, , , 1 , 1
, 1
(1 )
2
i
T ti i i ik
T t T t T t T ti
T t
I
K I K K
K
γδ δ− −
−
⎛ ⎞= + − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.3) 
 
2
,
, , , 1 , 1
, 1
(1 )
2
i
NT ti i i ik
NT t NT t NT t NT ti
NT t
I
K I K K
K
γδ δ− −
−
⎛ ⎞= + − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
including capital depreciation at rate δ and quadratic cost kγ  of capital stock 
adjustment.  
The NLC households maximise (3.1) given the budget constraint (3.2) which provides 
the first-order conditions (FOC) for consumption and financial asset holdings: 
 1/ ( ) (1 ) 0NLC c NLCt t tC
σ τ λ− + =  (3.4) 
 1 1/ (1 ) ( / ) 0
NLC C NLC C
t t t t t tP i E Pλ β λ + +− + =  
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*
, 1* 1
1 1 1
1 0
4
NLC NLC
H t rt t
t t tC Y C
t t t t
B
i E
P P Y P
λ λβ ω ε− +
− − +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + − + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
( ),1 0C NLC it t t k T tP NIλ μ γ− − =  
( ),1 0C NLC it t t k NT tP NIλ μ γ− − =  
( )( )1 1 1 1 1
, 12
1 , 1 , 1
,
1
1 ( ) 0
2
NLC k k k C
t t t t t t
i
T ti ik
t t t T t k T t i
T t
E i P
I
E NI NI
K
β λ τ τ δ
γμ β μ δ γ
+ + + + +
+
+ + +
− +
⎛ ⎞− + − − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
( )( )1 1 1 1 1
, 12
1 , 1 , 1
,
1
1 ( ) 0
2
NLC k k k C
t t t t t t
i
NT ti ik
t t t NT t k NT t i
NT t
E i P
I
E NI NI
K
β λ τ τ δ
γμ β μ δ γ
+ + + + +
+
+ + +
− +
⎛ ⎞− + − − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
where tE  is the expectations operator, NLCtλ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
(3.2), tμ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (3.3) and , , , 1/i i is t s t s tNI I K δ−≡ − , for 
,s T NT= . 
Combining the first two FOCs gives the Euler equation for the optimal path of NLC 
consumption: 
 
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
c C NLC
t t t
t c C NLC
t t t t
P CE
P C i
στβ τ + + +
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟ =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (3.5) 
Combing the second and third FOC for domestic bonds and foreign assets gives an 
interest parity condition including the risk premium:  
 
*
, 1*
1 14
H t r
t t tY
t t
B
i i
P Y
ω ε−
− −
= − +  (3.6) 
with ω>0 and the exogenous AR(1) risk-premium shock: 
 1
r r r
t r t tε ρ ε ν−= +  (3.7) 
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where rρ  is the shock persistence and rtν  an innovation with zero mean and standard 
deviation rσ . Note that equation (3.6) does not include an exchange rate term as we 
consider regions in a monetary union. 
The period budget constraint of LC households constituting the share slc of the 
population is: 
 , 2(1 ) (1 ) / 2( )
t
w i i LC c C LC w i C LC
t t t t t t t w t tW L TR P C P Lτ τ γ π− + = + +  (3.8) 
Real consumption by LC households is constrained by the disposable labour and 
transfer income and equals: 
 
2
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2 t
w i LC i
LC i LCt t t w t
t tc C c C c i
t t t t t t
W TR WC L L
P P W
τ γ
τ τ τ −
⎛ ⎞−= + − −⎜ ⎟+ + + ⎝ ⎠
 (3.9) 
The marginal value of the LC households’ income is analogous to the FOC for NLC 
households: 
 (1 ) / ( ) (1 ) 0LC c LCt t tC
σχ τ λ− − + =  (3.10) 
The per-capita level of consumption in the aggregate is the weighted average of NLC 
and LC consumption:  
 (1 ) NLC LCt t tC slc C slcC≡ − +  (3.11) 
Private demand combines domestically produced tradable ( ,
i
TH tC , ,
i
TH tI ), non-tradable  
( ,
i
NT tC , ,
i
NT tI ) and imported ( ,
i
TF tC , ,
i
TF tI ) goods. Assuming the same trade price elasticity 
for consumption and investment demand, we can aggregate ( , , )NLC LCt t t tZ C C I∈  and 
define tZ  as a CES aggregate of tradable ( ,
i
T tZ ) and non-tradable goods ( ,
i
NT tZ ): 
 
1 1 1 1 1
, ,( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )t T t NT tZ Z Z
ψ
ψ ψ ψ
ψ ψ ψ ψφ φ
− − −⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (3.12) 
where φ  and ψ  is the share of tradable goods and the elasticity of substitution between 
tradable and non-tradable goods, respectively. ,T tZ  is a composite index of domestically 
produced tradable goods ( ,TH tZ ) and imported goods ( ,TF tZ ) defined by: 
 57 
 
 
1 1 1 1 1
, , ,( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )T t TH t TF tZ h Z h Z
η
η η η
η η η η
− − −⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (3.13) 
where h  represents the steady-state home bias and η  indicates the elasticity of 
substitution between domestically produced goods and imports. ,TH tZ , ,TF tZ  and ,NT tZ  
are aggregates of the continuum of varieties j  given by: 
1 11
, ,0
( )jTH t TH tZ Z dj
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ , 
1 11
, ,0
( )jTF t TF tZ Z dj
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ , 
1 11
, ,0
( )jNT t NT tZ Z dj
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  (3.14) 
where ε  is the elasticity of substitution between these varieties. Each variety is 
produced by a specialised firm j.  
The domestic consumer price index ( CtP ) is given by: 
 
1
1 1 1
, ,( )( ) (1 )( )
C
t T t NT tP P P
ψ ψ ψφ φ− − −⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦  (3.15) 
where the domestic country price index for tradable goods ( ,T tP ) has the following 
form: 
 
1
1 1 1
, , ,( )( ) (1 )( )T t TH t TF tP h P h P
η η η− − −⎡ ⎤= + −⎣ ⎦  (3.16) 
The optimal allocation for any given expenditure yields the demand for each category of 
goods j: 
 ,, ,
,
j
TH tj
TH t TH t
TH t
P
Z Z
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,  ,, ,
,
j
TF tj
TF t TF t
TF t
P
Z Z
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,  ,, ,
,
j
NT tj
NT t NT t
NT t
P
Z Z
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.17) 
The elasticity ε  determines the price setting power of individual firms. The pricing 
margin of firms declines with increasing ε , because higher values of ε  magnify the 
impact of deviations from competitor prices on firm j’s market share. 
Finally, the optimal allocation of expenditures between traded and non-traded goods 
and between traded domestically produced and imported goods is: 
 ,,
T t
T t tC
t
P
Z Z
P
ψ
φ
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.18) 
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 ,, (1 )
NT t
NT t tC
t
P
Z Z
P
ψ
φ
−⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.19) 
 ,, ,
,
TH t
TH t T t
T t
P
Z h Z
P
η−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.20) 
 ,, ,
,
(1 ) TF tTF t T t
T t
P
Z h Z
P
η−⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.21) 
The households i supply labour services itL  to both tradable and non-tradable goods 
sectors: 
 , ,
i i i
t T t NT tL L L= +  (3.22) 
We assume that labour is mobile across both sectors, which equalises wages between 
the tradable and non-tradable goods sector. Total labour is a composite of the 
differentiated labour services: 
 
1 11
0
( )it tL L di
θ
θ θ
θ
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  (3.23) 
with θ being the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of labour services. The 
minimisation of labour costs by firms gives the demand function for variety i as: 
 
i
i t
t t
WL L
W
θ−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.24) 
The market power of worker i declines with increasing θ, because higher values of θ 
amplify the fall in the relative demand for itL  in response to higher individual wage 
claims.  
The labour services are distributed equally across NLC and LC households, and 
specialised labour unions represent the different types of labour services i in the wage 
setting. The wage setting is subject to quadratic adjustment costs, which provide an 
incentive to smooth the wage adjustment and lead to nominal wage stickiness. Since we 
assume identical wages itW  for both sectors, the optimisation problem of the labour 
union representing the labour service i is: 
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 ,1 , 20 0 ( ) (1 ) ( )1 2
i
TH tt i i w i i w it w
t t t t t t tC Ct
t t
PWE L L L
P P
ϕ γκβ λ τ λ πϕ
∞ +
=
⎛ ⎞− + − −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠∑  (3.25) 
The optimal wage maximises (3.25) given labour demand (3.24) and the marginal value 
of NLC income (3.4) and LC income (3.10). NLC and LC households receive the same 
wage, and the unions average the marginal value of NLC and LC income according to 
the population share of the two types of households. 
The optimisation problem is symmetric across unions i, which implies identical wages (
i
t tW W= ) and labour demand ( it tL L= ) across households. Hence, the aggregate wage 
setting equation is: 
, , 11 1 1
1
1 1
(1 )
1 1 1
tot
TH t TH tw w wt t w t w t t t
t t t tC tot C tot C
t t t t t t t t
P PW L W W LE
P W P W P L
ϕκ γ γ λθτ π β πθ λ θ θ λ
++ + +
+
− +
⎛ ⎞− = − + ⎜ ⎟− − − ⎝ ⎠
 (3.26) 
with 
 (1 )tot NLC LCt t tslc slcλ λ λ≡ − +  (3.27) 
where the gross wage claims increase with increasing labour taxation ( wtτ ) for given 
levels of employment. 
 
Firms 
The economy consists of a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms in the 
tradable and non-tradable sector. Firms are owned by NLC households, which 
consequently receive the firms’ profits. Each firm j in each sector s  produces a 
differentiated good ,
j
s tY  with capital , 1
j
s tK − , labour ,
j
s tL  and Cobb-Douglas production 
technology: 
 1, , , 1 ,( ) ( )
j j j
T t T t T t T tY A K L
α α−
−=  (3.28) 
1
, , , 1 ,( ) ( )
j j j
NT t NT t NT t NT tY A K L
α α−
−=  
The sector-specific total factor productivity ,s tA  is identical across firms and follows the 
AR(1) process: 
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  ( ), , 1 ,ln 1 ln ln as t a a s t s tA A Aρ ρ ν−= − + +  (3.29) 
where aρ  indicates the shock persistence and ,as tν  is a sector-specific innovation with 
zero mean and standard deviation aσ . 
The cost-minimal combination of capital and labour is given by: 
 ,
, 1
1j ks t t
j
s t t
L i
K W
α
α−
−=  (3.30) 
which implies for the nominal marginal costs ,
j
s tMC  of the optimising firm: 
 
1
, 1
,
( )
(1 )
k
j t t
s t
s t
i WMC
A
α α
α αα α
−
−= −  (3.31) 
and , ,
j
s t s tMC MC= . The firms in each sector u  face quadratic price adjustment costs pγ  
and set prices ,
j
TH tP  and ,
j
NT tP  to maximise the discounted expected profit. For the 
tradable sector and non-tradable sector firms profit maximisation has the following 
form: 
 , , , 20 , , . ,0
0 , ,
( )
2
j jNLC
pTH t T tt j j p jt
T t T t TH t T tNLCt
TH t TH t
P W
E Y L Y
P P
γλβ πλ
∞
=
⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  (3.32) 
 , , , 20 , , . ,0
0 , ,
( )
2
j jNLC
pNT t NT tt j j p jt
NT t NT t NT t NT tNLCt
NT t NT t
P W
E Y L Y
P P
γλβ πλ
∞
=
⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
The FOC with respect to ,
j
TH tP  ( ,
j
NT tP ) given the demand functions (3.17) and (3.42), the 
production technology (3.28) and the marginal utility of wealth of NLC households 
(3.4) describes the pricing behaviour of firm j in the tradable (non-tradable) sector: 
     , ,
, 11
, , , 1 , 1
,
1 (1 ) (1 )
TH t TH tNLC
TH tt
p TH t TH t p t TH t TH tNLC
t TH t
P MC
Y
E
Y
ε
λε γ π π γ β π πλ
++
+ +
= ⎛ ⎞− + + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.33) 
     , ,
, 11
, , , 1 , 1
,
1 (1 ) (1 )
NT t NT tNLC
NT tt
p NT t NT t p t NT t NT tNLC
t NT t
P MC
Y
E
Y
ε
λε γ π π γ β π πλ
++
+ +
= ⎛ ⎞− + + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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with , , , 1/ 1TH t TH t TH tP Pπ −≡ −  and , , , 1/ 1NT t NT t NT tP Pπ −≡ −  as the percentage change of the 
sectoral price deflator in the tradable and non-tradable sector.28 Contrary to the Calvo 
model of staggered price setting which implies price dispersion, the pricing behaviour 
under quadratic adjustment is symmetric across firms at each period in time, so that 
firm-level output in both sectors s  can be aggregated easily to total domestic 
production: 
 
1 1 1
, , 1 , , , 1 ,0
( ) ( )j jt s t s t s t s t s t s tY A K L dj A K L
α α α α− −
− −= =∫  (3.34) 
The nominal GDP is the sum of domestically produced tradable and non-tradable 
output: 
 , , , ,
Y
t t TH t T t NT t NT tP Y P Y P Y= +  (3.35) 
 
Government sector 
The government collects labour, capital and consumption taxes and issues one-period 
bonds to finance government purchases, transfers and the servicing of outstanding debt: 
 1 1 1( ) (1 )
w k k c C G
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tW L i K P C B P G TR i Bτ τ δ τ− − −+ − + + = + + +  (3.36) 
Government purchases are an aggregate of tradable and non-tradable goods as well as 
domestically produced traded and imported goods analogously to private demand in 
(3.12) and (3.14):29 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1/1 / 1 / 1 /1/ , ,1t T t NT tG G Gψψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψψφ φ− − −= + −  (3.37) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1/1 / 1 / 1 /1/, , ,1T t TH t TF tG h G h Gηη η η η η ηη− − −= + −  (3.38) 
1 11
, ,0
( )jTH t TH tG G dj
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ , 
1 11
, ,0
( )jTF t TF tG G dj
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ , 
1 11
, ,0
( )jNT t NT tG G dj
ε
ε ε
ε
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ (3.39) 
                                                 
28 Kumhof and Laxton (2013b) use inflation adjustment instead of price adjustment costs in their 
discussion of simple fiscal policy rules for open economies. Contrary to the standard price adjustment 
costs implying purely forward-looking inflation dynamics, inflation adjustment costs are a mechanism to 
generate endogenous inflation persistence. 
29 The EU’s internal market and public procurement policies have weakened the case for the alternative 
assumption of strong/full home bias in government consumption. 
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which gives equivalent demand functions for the alternative bundles and varieties j : 
 , , ,( / )TH t TH t t T tG h P P G
η−=  (3.40) 
 , , ,(1 )( / )TF t TF t t T tG h P P G
η−= −  (3.41) 
 ,, ,
,
j
TH tj
TH t TH t
TH t
P
G G
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,  ,, ,
,
j
TF tj
TF t TF t
TF t
P
G G
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,  ,, ,
,
j
NT tj
NT t NT t
NT t
P
G G
P
ε−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.42) 
In order to analyse the stabilising properties of budgetary neutral government spending 
shifting, the government can adjust purchases between the tradable and non-tradable 
goods sector in response to cyclical fluctuations. The policy takes the form of simple 
fiscal instrument rules30 that are similar to simple interest rate rules in monetary policy: 
 1 1
1
(1 )t t tG G
t t t
G G Y G
Y Y Y Y
ρ ρ− −
−
⎛ ⎞= + − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (3.43) 
 ( ), , 1
1
(1 ) 1 (1 )NT t NT tG G G Z t
t t
G G
Z
G G
ρ ρ φ ρ ξ−
−
= + − − + −  (3.44) 
Fiscal rule (3.43) determines the share of government purchases in GDP and, for  
0Gρ > , contains some persistence in the absolute level of government purchases. The 
instrument rule (3.44) determines the composition of government purchases between the 
non-tradable and tradable goods sector, where  implies a sectoral shift 
of government purchases in response to fluctuations in the trade balance gap, the output 
gap, and the employment gap, respectively. The rule also includes endogenous 
persistence of Gρ  to capture a preference of policy makers for smoothing changes in the 
policy stance.  
The government adjusts labour taxes to stabilise government debt and the budget deficit 
at their target levels according to: 
                                                 
30 The emphasis on simple instrument rules owes to their practical advantages over fully optimal policy 
solutions. Contrary to the fully optimal policy solution, simple rules use a limited set of information. 
Compliance with simple rules is, consequently, easier to monitor than the commitment to fully optimal 
policy, and the feasibility of compliance monitoring mitigates the credibility/time-consistency problem. 
Credibility is crucial, because it determines the policy maker's ability to anchor the expectations of 
households and firms. 
? ˆ ˆ[ / , , ]=Z TB Y Y L
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 1 11
1 1 1 14 4
w w t t
t t b dY Y
t t t t
B Bbtar
P Y P Y
τ τ ξ ξ− −−
− − − −
⎛ ⎞= + − + Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.45) 
where btar  is the target debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, the government increases the 
labour tax rate to collect additional revenue if debt and/or deficit levels exceed the target 
values. The labour tax closure increases the complexity of the model dynamics by 
affecting the labour supply decision of workers and the disposable period income and 
consumption demand of LC households. 
 
External accounts 
The total demand for domestic output is the sum of final domestic demand, net exports 
and the wage/price adjustment costs tADC : 
 ,( )
Y C G TH
t t t t t t t t t TF t t tP Y P C I P G P X P M ADC= + + + − +  (3.46) 
 2 2 2, , , ,( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2
p pww
t t t TH t T t NT t NT tADC L Y Y
γ γγ π π π≡ + +  
Exports tX  correspond to the import demand of the RoEA analogously to equation 
(3.21): 
 * *, ,(1 )( / )t TH t TH t tX h P P Y
η−= −  (3.47) 
which uses the fact that the tradable prices in the RoEA and the prices of RoEA-
produced tradables are (almost) identical from the perspective of the small domestic 
economy. We exclude price discrimination between countries, i.e. the law of one price 
holds. 
Combining the budget constraints of the private sector, i.e. (3.2) and (3.8), and the 
government (3.36) with the revenue-side definition of GDP as the sum of factor and 
profit income gives the aggregate resource constraint of the domestic economy: 
 * *, 1 , 1(1 ) ( )
Y C G Y
H t t H t t t t t t t t t tB i B P Y P C I P G P ADC− −= + + − + − −  (3.48) 
which is also the law of motion for the net foreign asset (NFA) position. The current 
account reflects the change in net foreign assets: 
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 * *, , 1t H t H tCA B B −= −  (3.49) 
As specified in (3.6), the nominal interest rate in the domestic economy depends on the 
NFA position to rule out explosive NFA dynamics (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2003) and 
the exogenous risk-premium shock. 
 
Rest of monetary union 
The RoEA is treated as one single block. Trade with the small country is negligible in 
relation to output and domestic demand, so that we approximate the RoEA as closed 
economy. The welfare function parallels the one for households in the small member 
country: 
 * 1 * 10
0
1 ( ) ( )
1 1
t i i
t t
t
E C Lσ ϕκβ σ ϕ
∞ − +
=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠∑  (3.50) 
The equivalent budget constraints imply analogous consumption and labour supply 
decisions: 
* * *1/ ( ) (1 ) 0NLC c NLCt t tC
σ τ λ− + =  
* * * * *
1 1/ (1 ) ( / ) 0
NLC NLC
t t t t t tP i E Pλ β λ + +− + =  
* * * *
,(1 ) 0
NLC i
t t t k T tP NIλ μ γ− − =  
* * * *
,(1 ) 0
NLC i
t t t k NT tP NIλ μ γ− − =  
* * * * *
1 1 1 1 1
,*
, 1* * * 2 *
1 , 1 , 1 ,*
,
((1 ) )
1 ( ) 0
2
NLC k k k
t t t t t t
i
T ti ik
t t t T t k T t i
T t
E i P
I
E NI NI
K
β λ τ τ δ
γμ β μ δ γ
+ + + + +
+
+ + +
− +
⎛ ⎞− + − − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
* * * * *
1 1 1 1 1
,*
, 1* * * 2 *
1 , 1 , 1 ,*
,
((1 ) )
1 ( ) 0
2
NLC k k k
t t t t t t
i
NT ti ik
t t t NT t k NT t i
NT t
E i P
I
E NI NI
K
β λ τ τ δ
γμ β μ δ γ
+ + + + +
+
+ + +
− +
⎛ ⎞− + − − + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 * * * * * * * , * 2 *(1 ) (1 ) / 2( )
t
c LC w i i w i
t t t t t t t w tP C W L TR Lτ τ γ π+ = − + −  (3.51) 
 * * *(1 ) NLC LCt t tC slc C slcC≡ − +  (3.52) 
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* * * * * *
* * *1 1 1
1* * * * * *
1
( )(1 )
1 1 1
tot
w w wt t w t w t t t
t t t ttot tot
t t t t t t
W L W W LE
P W W L
ϕκ γ γ λθτ π β πθ λ θ θ λ
+ + +
+
−
⎛ ⎞− = − + ⎜ ⎟− − − ⎝ ⎠
 (3.53) 
The government budget constraint is: 
 * * * * * * * * * * * *1 1(1 )
w c
t t t t t t t t t t t tW L P C B P G TR i Bτ τ − −+ + = + + +  (3.54) 
where * * *, ,t H t F tB B B≡ + . The fraction * ,H tB  equals the NFA position of the small domestic 
economy and * ,F tB  is RoEA government debt held by RoEA households. 
The government adjusts labour income taxes when public debt and deficits deviate from 
the target levels: 
 
* *
* * 1 1
1 * * * *
1 1 1 14 4
w w t t
t t b d
t t t t
B Bbtar
P Y P Y
τ τ ξ ξ− −−
− − − −
⎛ ⎞= + − + Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.55) 
Fiscal authorities in the RoEA may also react to cyclical fluctuations. However, given 
our focus on the small domestic member country and the availability of monetary policy 
at the aggregate RoEA level, we abstract from counter-cyclical fiscal rules in the RoEA. 
The central bank sets interest rates according to the simple rule: 
 * * * *1 1 1(1 )(1 ) / (1 )( ln )t i t i i y t ti i Y πψ ψ β β ψ ψ ψ π− − −= + − − + − Δ +  (3.56) 
The RoEA firms face a profit maximisation problem analogous to firms in the small 
domestic economy, which determines the foreign price level: 
    * *, ,* *
* * * *1 1
, , , 1 , 1* *1 (1 ) (1 )
TH t TH tNLC
t t
p TH t TH t p t TH t TH tNLC
t t
P MC
YE
Y
ε
λε γ π π γ β π πλ
+ +
+ +
= ⎛ ⎞− + + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.57) 
    * *, ,* *
* * * *1 1
, , , 1 , 1* *1 (1 ) (1 )
NT t NT tNLC
t t
p NT t NT t p t NT t NT tNLC
t t
P MC
YE
Y
ε
λε γ π π γ β π πλ
+ +
+ +
= ⎛ ⎞− + + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3.58) 
With * * *, , , 1/ 1TH t TH t TH tP Pπ −≡ −  and * * *, , , 1/ 1NT t NT t NT tP Pπ −≡ − . Total production is the 
aggregate of firm-level production in both sectors s : 
 
1* * * * 1 * * *
, , 1 , , , 1 ,0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j jt s t s t s t s t s t s tY A K L dj A K L
α α α α− 1−
− −= =∫  (3.59) 
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Demand in the RoEA region is the sum of private consumption, investment, 
government purchases and adjustment costs: 
 * * * * *t t t t tY C I G ADC= + + +  (3.60) 
 * * 2 * * 2 * * 2 *, , , ,( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2
p pww
t t t TH t T t NT t NT tADC L Y Y
γ γγ π π π≡ + +  
The NFA position of the RoEA is the mirror image of the small domestic economy’s 
NFA position. However, given the small size of the small open economy, the NFA 
position can be neglected in the aggregate resource constraint of the RoEA. 
 
3.3  Parameterisation 
The numerical values of the model parameters and exogenous variables are summarised 
in Table 7. The data for the calibration are taken from the European Commission’s 
AMECO and the OECD Main Economic Indicator (MEI) database. 
The parameters that determine the steady-state ratios are chosen to replicate the average 
share of private consumption (60%), investment (20%) government purchases (20%) in 
euro area GDP and the estimated average capital stock of 300% of annual GDP during 
1999-2009. We set the share of tradable goods in total consumption to 0.6φ =  in order 
to get a steady-state ratio of tradable goods to GDP of 60% (Lombardo and Ravenna 
2012). 
The tax rates on consumption, labour and capital income are euro area averages for 
1999-2009 from the European Commission’s Taxation Trends in the European Union 
database. Given the level of government purchases and the distortionary tax revenue, 
the steady-state volume of labour taxes is chosen to stabilise government debt at 70% of 
GDP, which is the euro area average 1999-2009. The parameters of the debt-
stabilisation rule imply tax rate increases of 0.001 (1.0) percentage points per 
percentage-point increase in government debt-to-GDP (deficit-to-GDP) ratios beyond 
their target levels. The parameters of the monetary policy rule are standard and without 
bearing on our results. 
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Table 7: Parameters and steady-state ratios of the model 
Parameter Symbol Value 
Consumption C/Y 0.60 
Investment  I/Y 0.20 
Government purchases G/Y 0.20 
Tradable goods T/Y 0.60 
Capital stock K/Y 12.0 
Consumption tax rate τc 0.18 
Labour tax rate τw 0.35 
Capital tax rate τk 0.44 
General transfers TR/Y 0.12 
Debt-to-GDP target btar 0.70 
Fiscal reaction to debt ξb 0.001 
Fiscal reaction to deficits ξd 1.00 
Fiscal instrument persistence ρG 0.50 
Interest rate persistence ψi 0.75 
Coefficient on output growth ψy 0.05 
Coefficient on inflation ψπ 1.15 
Cobb-Douglas parameter α 0.40 
Discount factor β 0.995 
Country risk premium ω -0.0025 
Steady-state TFP level A 0.47 
Substitution elasticity for goods varieties j ε 6.0 
Substitution elasticity between T/NT goods ψ 0.5 
Substitution elasticity for labour services i θ 6.0 
Home bias h 0.5 
Weight of utility of government purchases χ 0.20 
Weight of labour disutility κ 1.00 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ 1.00 
Labour supply elasticity 1/φ 0.25 
Share LC households slc 0.40 
Share of tradable goods on consumption φ 0.6 
Trade elasticity between home and foreign goods η 2 
Price adjustment costs γp 48 
Wage adjustment costs γw 80 
Capital adjustment costs γk 30 
Persistence of TFP shock ρa 0.92 
Persistence of risk premium shock ρr 0.85 
Standard deviation TFP innovation σa 0.025 
Standard deviation of risk innovation σr 0.024 
 
The Cobb-Douglas parameter α=0.40 is derived from the average labour income share 
and the marginal return to capital in the steady state. The quarterly capital depreciation 
rate compatible with the steady-state ratios of investment and capital is 1.7%, which 
together with the tax rate on capital income implies a quarterly equity premium of 2.2%, 
a quarterly interest rate on bonds of 0.6% and the quarterly discount factor β=0.995. The 
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endogenous component of the country risk premium is set to ω=0.0025, i.e. one 
percentage-point deterioration in the NFA-to-GDP position increases the annualised 
borrowing rate by one basis point. An external risk premium of this size has been 
estimated for Spain by Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal (2010). 
The values of ε=6 and θ=6 for the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods 
and labour services imply steady-state price and wage mark-ups of 20% that are in line 
with empirical estimates by Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012). The elasticity of 
substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods is ψ=0.5 (Rabanal 2009).31 The 
consumption home bias in the demand for domestically produced tradable goods is set 
to h=0.5 to match the average import-to-GDP ratio of a group of eight smaller EA-12 
countries during 1999-2009.32  
The weights of public purchases (χ=0.2) and employment (κ=1) in the utility function 
are chosen so that the euro area average levels of consumption, government purchases 
and employment for 1999-2009 satisfy the households’ optimality conditions. The 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 1/σ=1.0 in the benchmark model, i.e. 
standard logarithmic consumption utility. The value 1/φ=0.25 for the elasticity of labour 
supply lies in the range of microeconomic estimates, even though DSGE models often 
use higher values (Evers et al. 2008; Fiorito and Zanella 2008). 
The estimates for the share of liquidity-constrained households (slc) in the euro area 
cluster around 0.40 (e.g. Forni et al. 2009; Ratto et al. 2009). The trade elasticity 
between domestic and foreign tradable goods is η=2 and corresponds to euro area 
estimates by Imbs and Méjean (2010). Price and wage adjustment costs are set to match 
the average price and wage durations of 4 and 5 quarters reported by Druant et al. 
(2009) and Knell (2013) and to generate demand and employment volatility in the range 
of empirical values for the group of eight smaller EA-12 members given the exogenous 
shocks. The parameter for capital adjustment costs is chosen to obtain empirically 
plausible values for the volatility of investment. 
                                                 
31 The relatively low value is common in the literature that estimates open economy sticky price models 
because it explains higher volatility of relative prices than relative quantities (Lubik and Schorfheide 
2006; Rabanal 2009). 
32 The countries are AUT, BEL, ESP, FIN, GRC, IRL, NLD and PRT. The focus on this group of smaller 
countries among the early EA members is motivated by the fact that these countries have already more 
than one decade of EA history to quantify the role of asymmetric shocks. 
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The technology (TFP) shock in the tradable and non-tradable sector is the estimated 
AR(1) process for the model-consistent Solow residual given the data on real output and 
factor inputs. The shock is estimated on the gap between the Solow residuals of the 
eight smaller EA-12 countries and the euro area average TFP level in 1999q1-2009q4. 
The use of TFP gaps relative to the euro area average rather than of absolute TFP levels 
derives from the focus on asymmetric shocks. In the same spirit, the risk-premium 
shock is the estimated AR(1) dynamics of the eight smaller EA-12 countries’ interest 
rate spread over the German rate for 10-year government bonds in 1999q1-2009q4.  
Table 8: Comparing model and data moments 
Variable 
Baseline calibration Actual data 
Correlation Standard Correlation with output Standard deviation 
with output deviation Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
Output  1.00  0.03  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.02  0.03  0.01  
Consumption  0.78  1.32  0.78  0.94  0.42  0.74  1.21  0.26  
Employment  0.50  1.39  0.63  0.96  0.29  0.70  1.40  0.47  
Investment 0.86 2.03 0.82 0.94 0.68 2.77 3.59 1.70 
Trade balance  -0.39  0.59  -0.25  0.20  -0.66  1.13  1.42  0.80  
Gov. purchases  1.00  1.00  0.17  0.48  -0.12  0.97  2.47  0.42  
Inflation  0.37  0.30  0.12  0.68  -0.40  0.57  1.05  0.37  
Note: All moments are based on quarterly data. Except for inflation and the trade balance, the 
variables are in logarithms and model-generated and data series HP-filtered (λ=1600). The mean for 
actual data is the non-weighted average AUT, BEL, ESP, FIN, GRC, IRL, NLD and PRT during 
1999q1-2009q4; maximum and minimum values refer to the highest and lowest ranking country in 
this group for a particular measure. The data are seasonally and working-day adjusted. The trade 
balance is relative to GDP, and inflation is the year-on-year percentage change in the core CPI. The 
standard deviation is the absolute standard deviation for output and the standard deviation relative to 
the standard deviation of output for all other variables. 
Table 8 compares characteristic moments of the benchmark model under the 
combination of TFP and risk premium shocks and in the absence of fiscal stabilisation 
of business cycle fluctuations to data for the group of smaller EA12 countries in the 
period 1999q1-2009q4. It shows that the model matches important aspects of the data 
fairly well. Namely, the model replicates the correlation of private demand, investment, 
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the trade balance, employment and inflation with output at business cycle frequencies in 
qualitative terms. Data patterns of the relative volatility are also replicated. Namely, the 
model replicates the observed high volatility of investment. The size of model-generated 
employment and government purchases volatility lies within the range of values in the 
data; however, the trade balance is less volatile in the model. Compared to the data, 
private consumption is more volatile in the model, which is linked to fixing the share of 
government purchases to GDP in the baseline model, so that private demand absorbs 
additional fluctuations in aggregate demand. The low volatility of CPI inflation in the 
model relative to the data can be linked partly to the assumption of constant import 
prices in the model simulations, which derives from the exclusive focus on country-
specific shocks. 
 
3.4  Impulse responses 
In order to analyse the stabilising effects of budgetary-neutral shifts of government 
purchases between T and NT goods and compare it to the effects of fiscal devaluation 
we present simulations for economy-wide TFP and risk premium shocks under different 
model and policy settings (Table 9). 
Table 9: Alternative policy versions for impulse responses 
Model version Assumptions 
No policy (NP) No cyclical fiscal policy response 
Fiscal devaluation (FD) Tax shift from labour tax to consumption tax to stabilise trade balance gap (TBY_GAP) 
Budgetary-neutral fiscal 
policy (BN_TBY; BN_Y) 
Counter-cyclical fiscal policy response to trade balance gap 
(TBY_GAP) and output gap (Y_GAP) 
 
First, we portray the no-policy case (NP) to illustrate the differences between an 
economy with and without price and wage stickiness. Second, we show impulse 
responses (IRFs) for fiscal devaluation (FD) as (ex ante) budgetary-neutral tax shift that 
affects the real exchange rate and external accounts. Third, we examine the stabilisation 
potential of a budgetary-neutral reallocation of government purchases between T/NT 
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goods. To illustrate the trade-off between domestic (output) stabilisation and the 
dampening of swings in the external position, we show IRFs for expenditure-switching 
rules in which the policy instrument reacts either to external imbalances (excessive 
volatility in the trade balance) or domestic fluctuations (output gap). 
The policy rules that are discussed in this chapter focus on trade balance and output 
gaps rather than absolute levels as target variables. The gaps are defined conventionally 
as per-cent (output gap) or percentage-point (trade balance to GDP) deviations of actual 
levels from the levels that would prevail in an economy with fully flexible prices and 
wages. The focus on the fiscal response to gaps rather than levels allows considering 
variations in the variables as excess volatility and examining whether fiscal policy can 
mitigate excess volatility associated with sticky price and wage adjustment. 
Given the loss of autonomous monetary policy in monetary union, fiscal policy may 
take over (part of) the stabilisation role at the national level. The most prominent 
budget-neutral policy to mimic nominal depreciation in order to stabilise domestic 
activity and external positions is fiscal devaluation. Correia (2011), de Mooij and Keen 
(2013), and Farhi et al. (2011), among others, show that a shift of government revenue 
from social security contributions to the VAT can replicate the real effects of nominal 
exchange rate devaluation. We simulate a temporary fiscal devaluation as a benchmark 
for our government expenditure shifting rule similar to (3.44): 
 ?( )1 (1 ) (1 ) /c c c tt G t G G Z TB Yτ ρ τ ρ τ ρ ξ−= + − + −  (3.61) 
where (3.61) implies a shift in the consumption tax in response to fluctuations in the 
trade balance gap. The tax shift is revenue-neutral in the sense that the overall level of 
government revenues is kept constant. Thus, the labour tax is adjusted by the increase in 
consumption tax: 
  (3.62) 
A negative parameter value ( ) implies an increase in consumption tax and a 
decline in the labour tax rate in case of an excessive trade balance deficit. 
( )1 11
1 1 1 14 4
τ τ ξ ξ τ τ− −−
− − − −
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The alternative policy of a budgetary-neutral expenditure rule adjusts the T/NT 
composition of government consumption according to (3.44): 
 ( ), , 1
1
(1 ) 1 (1 )NT t NT tG G G Z t
t t
G G
Z
G G
ρ ρ φ ρ ξ−
−
= + − − + −  (3.44) 
where ? ˆ[ , ]Z TB Y Y=  implies a shift in the composition of government consumption in 
response to fluctuations in the trade balance gap as an indicator of external imbalances 
or the output gap as an indicator of domestic imbalances.33 A counter-cyclical response 
in our setting implies that the government responds to stabilise the chosen indicator. 
Specifically, if the trade balance gap is negative, implying lower net exports compared 
to the flexible economy, the government aims at increasing net exports by shifting 
purchases from T to NT sector ( ) in order to reduce import demand and to bring 
the economy closer to the flexible-economy trade balance response. 
The parameter values  for fiscal devaluation (3.61) and the budgetary-neutral 
expenditure rule (3.44) are chosen such that a 0.5 percentage-point decline in the trade 
balance gap leads, respectively, to a 1 percentage-point increase in the consumption tax, 
with a corresponding labour tax reduction, or an expenditure shift in government 
purchases from T to NT goods by 1 percentage point of GDP. 
 
3.4.1  Negative economy‐wide productivity shock (competitiveness loss) 
The dynamic responses to a temporary decline in factor productivity (TFP) by 2.5 
percentage points in the small open economy relative to the rest of euro area (RoEA) are 
depicted in Figure 9.34 As the impulse responses are expressed in gaps, they show per-
cent deviations (percentage-point deviations for trade balance, government debt, tax 
rates and government purchases) of actual levels from levels in the flexible economy, 
i.e. the economy without wage and price stickiness. In a frictionless economy, a decline 
                                                 
33 To keep the analysis concise, we only show the results for output gap stabilisation. Results for a policy 
rule reacting to the employment gap are similar to the results for the policy rule responding to the output 
gap. 
34 More detailed impulse responses, including separate IRFs for the frictionless economy, can be found in 
the related working paper (Hohberger et al. 2013). 
0<Zξ
Zξ
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in TFP decreases the level of output, investment and consumption through an increase 
in domestic goods prices which is also associated with an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and a deteriorating trade balance. In the economy with price/wage 
stickiness, the output reduction in response to the negative TFP shock is less 
pronounced. Price stickiness delays the increase in domestic goods prices and leads to a 
period of lower real interest rates, so that consumption and investment decline more 
moderately with productivity. Taken together this no-policy scenario (NP) leads to 
positive output, consumption and investment gaps. The real exchange rate appreciation 
is less pronounced on impact, i.e. a negative real exchange rate gap, but with higher 
persistence in the adjustment process which further deteriorates the trade balance, 
leading to a negative trade balance gap in the medium term. 
Figure 9: Negative TFP shock and policy responses to the trade balance gap 
 
 
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
%
Quarter
Real exchange rate
NP FD BN_TBY
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter
Trade balance
NP FD BN_TBY
% of GDP
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
%
Quarter
Output
NP FD BN_TBY
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
%
Quarter
Employment
NP FD BN_TBY
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
%
Quarter
Consumption
NP FD BN_TBY
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
%
Quarter
Investment
NP FD BN_TBY
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
%
Quarter
Real interest rate
NP FD BN_TBY
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Quarter
NT government purchases
BN_TBY
% of GDP
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
pp
Quarter
Consumption tax
FD
 74 
 
In response to the negative TFP shock, fiscal devaluation (FD), i.e. an (ex ante) 
revenue-neutral combination of labour tax reduction and consumption tax increase 
reduces the trade balance gap (Figure 9). More specifically, a temporary increase in 
consumption tax by 0.5 percentage points in response to the excessive trade balance 
deterioration more than halves the trade balance gap. At the same time, it also reduces 
the consumption, employment and output gaps slightly.  
A response of the budgetary-neutral expenditure-composition rule to the trade balance 
gap (BN_TBY) that shifts government purchases from T to NT in order to reduce the 
demand for imports and the trade deficit, reduces the trade balance gap substantially, 
but does not contribute to the stabilisation of consumption, employment and output 
(Figure 9). Instead, consumption, employment and output gaps become slightly larger 
compared to the no-policy case. The one-to-one shift of government purchases from T 
to NT reduces import demand and improves the trade balance, but at the same time 
increases the demand for domestic output (tradables are partly imported, whereas non-
tradables are 100% produced domestically). Hence, the demand shift towards NT 
increases the demand for domestic output and the employment and output gap. This 
puts upward pressure on prices (illustrated in Figure 9 by less REER depreciation), 
which further reduces the real interest rate. 
Stabilising the output gap (BN_Y) with the expenditure-switching rule rather than the 
trade balance gap (BN_TBY) requires a shift of government expenditures from NT to T 
in the case of a negative TFP shock to reduce the positive output gap (output being 
higher in the economy with nominal rigidities than in the flexible economy). 
Specifically, the parameter value of 4Zξ = −  in Figure 10 implies a shift in government 
purchases from NT to T goods of 0.5 percentage points of GDP. The shift in 
government purchases from NT to T reduces the demand for domestic output, i.e. 
dampens the positive employment and output gaps. It also dampens upward pressure on 
prices, which mitigates the fall in the real interest rate and reduces the positive 
consumption gap. The switch towards T demand does also strengthen the demand for 
imports, however, leading to further deterioration in the trade balance. In the example of 
Figure 10, the trade balance gap more than doubles compared to the no-policy case.  
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Figure 10: Negative TFP shock and domestic (Y_GAP) vs. external (TBY_GAP) 
stabilisation policies 
 
 
 
3.4.2  Negative risk premium shock (demand boom) 
The dynamic responses to a temporary negative risk premium shock of 2.4 percentage 
points relative to the rest of euro area (RoEA) are depicted in Figure 11.35 Again, the 
impulse responses are shown in gaps, i.e. relative to the economy without wage and 
price rigidities. The negative risk premium shock reduces domestic borrowing rates in 
the economy without nominal rigidities, which strengthens domestic consumption and 
investment demand and, consequently, the demand for imports. The increase in 
                                                 
35 Here, we combine the different policy instruments (Table 9) in one Figure. 
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domestic demand increases factor demand and puts upward pressure on wage and price, 
which leads to real exchange rate appreciation and a loss in price competitiveness. Both, 
the increase in import demand and the loss in price competitiveness deteriorate the trade 
balance. Price and wage stickiness in the no-policy scenario (NP) delay the rise in 
prices/wages in response to higher demand and lead to a period of low real interest 
rates, which further strengthens domestic and import demand and deteriorates the trade 
balance response despite the dampening of REER appreciation. 
Figure 11: Demand boom and alternative stabilisation policies 
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the REER appreciation compared to the no-policy case, which mitigates the 
deterioration in the trade balance. Figure 11 suggests that a temporary shift towards the 
consumption tax by circa 0.5 percentage points more than halves the trade balance gap 
compared to the NP scenario. 
Similar to the TFP shock, a response of the composition of government purchases to the 
trade balance gap (BN_TBY) implies a shift of government consumption from T to NT 
goods to reduce import demand and the trade balance deficit. Compared to fiscal 
devaluation which dampens both domestic and import demand, the shift from T to NT 
in government purchases reduces imports but increase the demand for domestic output. 
The additional demand for domestic output increases the domestic employment and 
output gap and puts additional upward pressure on production costs and prices as 
illustrated by a smaller negative REER gap in Figure 11. The stronger price pressure 
despite price stickiness reduces the real interest rate, which increases consumption 
demand. Figure 11 shows that a shift in government purchases from T to NT goods by 
0.4 percentage point of GDP dampens the trade balance deterioration substantially, but 
at the cost of a stronger cyclical response of domestic demand, employment and output. 
In contrast, stabilising domestic activity (BN_Y) requires a shift in government 
purchases from NT to T in response to the risk premium decline to dampen the demand 
for domestic output and reduce the domestic employment and output gap, bringing 
domestic variables closer to the solution without wage and price stickiness. Again, 
increasing government purchases of T leads to further deterioration of the trade balance, 
highlighting the trade-off between stabilising domestic activity (BN_Y) and reducing 
excessive swings in the trade balance (BN_TBY) in the short and medium term. 
Table 10 shows the standard deviations of the output, consumption, employment and 
trade balance gaps and their correlation with the output gap under the combination of 
TFP and demand shocks to summarise the impulse responses under the different policy 
rules. The numbers illustrate the trade-off for the expenditure switching rule. Lower 
output gaps (BN_Y) are associated with higher trade balance gaps compared to the no-
policy case, whereas smaller trade balance gaps (BN_TBY) are associated with stronger 
volatility of domestic variables. As show above, fiscal devaluation (FD) does not face 
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this trade-off and reduces fluctuations in domestic variables and the trade balance 
compared to the no-policy case.  
Table 10: Standard deviations and correlations under different policy rules 
Note: Results refer to the variables in gaps, i.e. per-cent deviations of actual levels from levels in 
the flexible economy (percentage-point deviations for the trade balance relative to GDP). The 
parameter values for the different policy rules correspond to those in Figures 9-11. 
 
 
3.5  Welfare analysis 
In a final step we illustrate the welfare effects of the budgetary-neutral expenditure-
switching rule for government purchases (3.44) in the context of external and domestic 
stabilisation and of fiscal devaluation (3.61-3.62). Following, e.g., Evers (2012), we 
compute welfare effects based on a second-order Taylor expansion of the household 
utility function (3.1) around the deterministic steady state. In terms of log-deviation, the 
second-order Taylor approximation of the period utility yields: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 1 21 1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , ) 1 1 2 2t t t t t tc lEu c l c Ec l El c Ec l El
σ ϕ
σ ϕ σ ϕκ κ σ κ ϕσ ϕ
− +
− − − − +≈ − + − − −− +  (3.63) 
where  and  denote the steady-state level and  and  the period log-deviation 
from the steady state. The quantitative results refer to the overall welfare effects, i.e. the 
combination of mean and variance effects. 
We run simulations over the interval [-25; 10] for the fiscal stabilisation parameter  
in steps of 0.2. Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and gains are expressed 
c l tcˆ tlˆ
Zξ
Standard deviations under the combination of TFP and demand shocks in % 
 Output Private Consumption Employment 
Trade 
balance 
No policy 0.0344 0.0367 0.0570 0.0042 
Fiscal devaluation 0.0337 0.0310 0.0558 0.0017 
External stabilisation 0.0361 0.0374 0.0598 0.0010 
Domestic stabilisation 0.0265 0.0321 0.0438 0.0097 
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in percent of steady-state consumption for NLC households, LC households and the 
population average (TOTAL), which is the weighted mean of the NLC and LC welfare 
gains.36 
We show welfare gains (positive values) or losses (negative values) for a range of 
policy parameter values  instead of focusing exclusively on the welfare-maximising 
parameter values within this range. Looking at a broader range for  highlights the 
loss associated with non-optimal policy and provides information on the robustness of 
welfare effects with respect to variations in . The welfare effects are computed for 
the combination of TFP and risk premium shocks that underlies the model calibration.37 
Figure 12: Welfare effects for external stabilisation policies 
 
Note:  Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state 
consumption. 
Figure 12 shows that a fiscal devaluation leads to welfare gains for both LC and NLC 
households for values of  that stabilise both domestic variables and the trade balance. 
An FD response that lowers the labour tax and increases the consumption tax in 
response to a negative trade balance gap generates average welfare gains of up to 0.6% 
of steady state consumption for the parameter range considered here. While increasing 
                                                 
36 Previous contributions measuring welfare effects of fiscal policy relative to non-stabilisation and in per 
cent of steady state consumption include Ferrero (2009), Evers (2012), Kumhof and Laxton (2013b) and 
Vogel et al. (2013). 
37 The different illustrated parameter ranges in Figure 12 are chosen to assume that both policies responds 
to a 0.5 percentage-point decline in the trade balance gap by a tax (expenditure) shift from labour to 
consumption tax (T to NT goods) of approximately 1 percentage point (1 percentage point of GDP). 
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the VAT in periods of trade balance deterioration, which under TFP and demand shocks 
are also periods of increasing consumer prices, reduces the purchasing power of income, 
LC income effects are overcompensated by the labour tax reduction and the stabilisation 
of labour demand, leading to LC welfare gains. In the case of NLC households, the 
VAT increase replicates the real interest rate increase under flexible prices, which is 
otherwise less pronounced under sticky prices. Replication of the real interest rate of the 
flexible economy reduces the NLC consumption gap and improves the welfare of NLC 
households. 
In contrast, budgetary-neutral shift in government purchases between T and NT goods 
to dampen swings in the trade balance deteriorate the welfare of domestic households 
by up to 1% and 0.2% of steady-state consumption for LC households and NLC 
households, respectively, because of the trade-off between the stabilisation of the trade 
balance and the stabilisation of domestic variables discussed in section 3.4. LC 
households without access to financial markets to smooth income and consumption over 
time suffer particularly from higher employment volatility associated with trade balance 
stabilisation under the expenditure-switching rule. 
A budgetary-neutral expenditure-switching rule with focus on stabilising domestic 
activity (BN_Y) increases household welfare by up to 1.7% and 0.8% of steady-state 
consumption for LC households and NLC households, respectively, for the parameter 
range considered here (Figure 13). As both types of households have identical period 
utility functions (2.1), the welfare effects are larger for LC consumers, who are unable 
to smooth their consumption over time and, hence, benefit more than NLC consumers 
from fiscal policies that stabilise temporary income fluctuations by stabilising domestic 
activity.  
Comparing the potential welfare and stabilisation effects of the expenditure-switching 
rule for government purchases with the fiscal devaluation scenario shows, again, that 
fiscal devaluation can achieve external stabilisation and welfare gains simultaneously, 
whereas the expenditure-switching policy rule implies a trade-off. The expenditure-
switching rule achieves substantial welfare gains for both household groups by 
stabilising domestic activity, but generates welfare losses when focusing on trade 
balance stabilisation. 
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Figure 13: Welfare effects for domestic devaluation 
 
Note:  Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed 
in % of steady state consumption. 
The magnitude of potential welfare gains (or losses) is in line with Kirsanova et al. 
(2007) and Vogel et al. (2013), but high compared to the results in Dellas and Tavlas 
(2005). Dellas and Tavlas (2005) use a model with nominal wage rigidity but fully 
flexible prices, contrary to our combination of nominal wage stickiness, price stickiness 
and a fixed nominal exchange rate regime that induces more gradual wage and price 
adjustment and a stronger initial response of real variables. The combination of sticky 
nominal wages and prices in our model generates real wage rigidity and induces higher 
fluctuations in welfare terms compared to models with only wage or price stickiness as 
shown in Erceg et al. (2000) and Duval and Vogel (2012). This is supported by a 
sensitivity analysis, which shows that welfare effects in our model diminish with 
declining price stickiness. In case of fully flexible prices, maximum welfare losses for 
the expenditure-switching rule focusing on trade balance stabilisation would decline 
from 0.6% of steady-state consumption in Figure 12 to 0.03% of steady-state 
consumption for the household average. 
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3.6  Conclusion 
This chapter develops a two-sector (tradables and non-tradables) DSGE model of a 
small open economy in monetary union with nominal and real rigidities to analyse the 
potential of simple fiscal policy rules to stabilise macroeconomic fluctuations, notably 
excess volatility in the external accounts. We focus on simple policy rules that adjust 
the composition of government purchases between tradable and non-tradable goods in 
response to excessive fluctuations in the trade balance or domestic activity. The policy 
rules are budgetary-neutral in the sense that the level of government expenditure is kept 
ex-ante constant. We compare the performance of this expenditure-composition rule to 
fiscal devaluation understood as a shift of the tax burden from labour to consumption in 
response to trade deficits. 
Our results suggest that a state-dependent sectoral reallocation of government purchases 
between tradables and non-tradables can stabilise excessive fluctuations in external 
positions (trade balance gap), but with accompanying welfare losses of up to 0.6% on 
average household. In contrast, welfare gains of up to 1% of steady-state consumption 
for the average household are obtained when the policy rule targets the stabilisation of 
domestic activity (output gap). The findings show a trade-off between stabilising 
domestic activity and enhancing household welfare, on the one hand, and reducing 
excessive trade balance fluctuations , on the other hand, for the expenditure-switching 
policy rule. The trade-off does not exist for fiscal devaluation as a tax shift from labour 
to consumption in response to excessive trade deficits. The fiscal devaluation as 
implemented in the model reduces both fluctuations in the trade balance and 
fluctuations in domestic activity and demand and generates welfare gains of up to 0.6% 
on average in our simulations. 
While the magnitude of potential welfare gains or costs is similar to other studies with 
models including a multitude of nominal and real frictions, such as Kirsanova et al. 
(2007) and Vogel et al. (2013), the welfare effects are rather large compared to, e.g., 
Dellas and Tavlas (2005). Contrary to Dellas and Tavlas (2005), our model structure 
includes both nominal wage and price stickiness, which gives rise to real wage rigidity 
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(see Erceg et al. 2000; Duval and Vogel 2012), and real frictions that amplify the costs 
of volume rather than price adjustment. 
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4.1  Introduction 
This chapter deals with a classical theme of the currency union literature, namely the 
role and potential of fiscal policy to stabilise asymmetric shocks and macroeconomic 
fluctuations at the level of member states, i.e. shocks that are not stabilised by a 
common monetary policy that focuses on union-wide aggregates. A key lesson from the 
euro area crisis is that the room for fiscal policy as stabilisation device becomes very 
restricted when fiscal limits are tight. Against this background, this approach analyses 
the potential of a state-dependent reallocation of government purchases between 
tradable and non-tradable goods as tool for business-cycle stabilisation and assesses 
associated welfare gains. A main characteristic of the state-dependent sectoral 
reallocation of government purchases is its (ex ante) budgetary neutrality, which makes 
it a feasible policy even when fiscal limits are tight, i.e. when the government cannot 
adopt classical counter-cyclical deficit spending.  
This approach builds on the recent literature on fiscal policy rules for macroeconomic 
stabilisation (e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2007; Kollmann 2008; Galí and Monacelli 
2008; Kumhof and Laxton 2013b). We use a two-sector New Keynesian DSGE model 
of monetary union with Ricardian and liquidity-constraint households, nominal price 
and wage stickiness and labour and capital as production factors and implement simple 
fiscal instrument rules that adjust the composition of government purchases between 
tradables and non-tradables in response to business cycle indicators such as employment 
or output gaps. Following Galí and Monacelli (2008), and contrary to Beetsma and 
Jensen (2004), Kirsanova et al. (2007), and Ferrero (2009), the analysis focuses on a 
small member country of monetary union, which excludes feedback to monetary policy 
and the rest of monetary union. The rational for the small-member focus is the stronger 
exposure of small economies to asymmetric shocks and their small weight in union-
wide macroeconomic aggregates, which a common monetary policy focuses on. 
This chapter finds that shifting government expenditure between tradable and non-
tradable goods can be a useful instrument to stabilise domestic activity in response to 
asymmetric (economy-wide or sector-specific) supply and demand shocks. Potential 
welfare gains are higher than welfare gains from a classical deficit spending rule that 
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adjusts the overall amount of government purchases in response to cyclical indicators. 
The higher welfare gains derive from the fact that the state-dependent reallocation of 
government purchases across sectors is less subject to a trade-off between counter-
cyclical demand stabilisation and the stabilisation of government deficit or debt levels, 
which is characteristic for the standard deficit spending.  
 
4.2  Model 
The model is in the spirit of Galí and Monacelli (2008) who discuss optimal monetary 
and fiscal policy in a monetary union. The small open economy is modeled as one 
among a continuum of small open economies forming the monetary union. The small 
economy does not have significant impact on the overall development of the union 
aggregate or the common monetary policy. Our set-up consists of two regions, namely a 
small (domestic) member country and the rest of monetary union, and two sectors, 
namely tradable (T) and non-tradable (NT) goods production. The model features 
monopolistic competition in goods and labour markets, nominal price and wage 
stickiness, and capital and labour as production factors. Households are either 
intertemporal optimising consumers (NLC) that can freely borrow and save to smooth 
consumption over time, or liquidity-constrained (LC) households who consume their 
entire current disposable net wage and transfer income (Galí et al. 2007). In light of the 
empirical evidence (Kollmann 1996), we depart from the assumption of complete risk-
sharing as in Beetsma and Jensen (2004), Galí and Monacelli (2008), and Kirsanova et 
al. (2007) and introduce a debt-dependent country risk premium as external closure 
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2003). Goods markets are imperfectly integrated across 
borders in the sense that there is a home bias in the demand for tradable goods. Labour 
is immobile between countries. The rest of monetary union and monetary policy are 
exogenously given from the small economy’s perspective. The model parameters are 
calibrated to key characteristics of an average small EMU member country. For the sake 
of brevity, this chapter only displays the equations for the government sector to focus on 
the fiscal policy rules. Figure 14 summarises the structure of the model.38 
                                                 
38 The detailed description of the model structure can be found in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 14: Model structure 
 
 
Given the focus on (ex ante) budgetary-neutral expenditure adjustment, the modelling of 
the public sector deserves more detail.39 The government collects labour income ( wτ ), 
capital income ( kτ ) and consumption ( cτ ) taxes and issues one-period bonds ( tB ) to 
finance government purchases ( tG ), transfers ( tTR ) and the servicing of outstanding 
debt, 1 1(1 )t ti B− −+ : 
                                                 
39 The policy is budgetary neutral ex ante. The ex post impact on the government balance can differ due 
to endogenous changes in the tax base in response to the policy and due to endogenous changes in the 
relative price of tradable/non-tradable goods. 
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 1 1 1( ) (1 )
w k k c C G
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tW L i K P C B P G TR i Bτ τ δ τ− − −+ − + + = + + +  (4.1) 
Government purchases tG  are composed of tradables ( ,
i
T tG ) and non-tradables ( ,
i
NT tG ), 
where ,T tG  is a composite of domestically-produced tradables ( ,TH tG ) and imported 
goods ( ,TF tG ):40 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1/1 / 1 / 1 /1/, , ,1T t TH t TF tG h G h Gηη η η η η ηη− − −= + −  (4.2) 
The parameter h  represents the steady-state home bias, and η  is the elasticity of 
substitution between domestically produced tradables and imports. 
Expenditure for total government purchases is the sum of expenditure on tradable and 
non-tradable goods:  
 , ,
G T NT
t t t T t t NT tP G P G P G= +  (4.3) 
The government can allocate purchases between tradables and non-tradables in response 
to cyclical fluctuations. The policy takes the form of simple fiscal instrument rules in 
analogy to simple interest rate rules in monetary policy:41 
 , , 1
1
(1 ) (1 )NT t NT t NTG G G Z t
t t
G G G Z
G G G
ρ ρ ρ ξ−
−
= + − + −  (4.4) 
The instrument rule (4.4) determines shifts in the allocation of government spending 
between non-tradables and tradables, where ˆ ˆ[ , , ]T NTZ Y L P P=  implies a response to 
indicators such as the output gap, the employment gap or the relative price of the 
sectoral output.42 
The government adjusts labour taxes to stabilise government debt and the budget deficit 
according to: 
                                                 
40 In the case of EMU, the EU’s internal market and public procurement policies have weakened the 
plausibility of assuming full home bias in government purchases. 
41 The focus on simple instrument rules to assess the stabilising potential of fiscal policy is widely-used in 
the literature (e.g. van Aarle et al. 2008; Kumhof and Laxton 2013b; Vogel et al. 2013). The practical 
advantages of simple rules over fully optimal policy solutions are that simple rules use limited 
information sets and are (hence) easier to monitor than the commitment to fully optimal policy. Better 
compliance monitoring mitigates the credibility/time-consistency problem. 
42 Within this framework, I do not address the potential of fiscal policy to correct external imbalances, 
which is an important aspect in the literature on fiscal devaluation (Farhi et al. 2011; de Mooij and Keen 
2013; Hohberger et al. 2014a). 
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 1 11
1 1 1 14 4
w w t t
t t b dY Y
t t t t
B Bbtar
P Y P Y
τ τ ξ ξ− −−
− − − −
⎛ ⎞= + − + Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (4.5) 
where btar  is the target debt-to-GDP ratio (here, 70%). The parameters bξ  and dξ  in 
(4.5) are set to imply tax rate increases of 0.001 and 1.0 percentage point per 
percentage-point increase in government debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios, 
respectively. Changes in the labour tax affect the labour supply decision of workers, the 
disposable period income and, hence, consumption demand by LC households. The 
detailed model calibration can be found in Chapter 3.3. 
 
4.3  The stabilising potential of sectoral expenditure 
reallocation 
To illustrate the stabilising effect of government expenditure reallocation between 
tradable and non-tradable goods we present simulations for demand (interest rate/risk 
premium) shocks and economy-wide as well as sectoral supply (TFP) shocks under 
alternative model and policy settings (see Table 11). 
Table 11: Alternative model versions and policy rules 
Model version Assumptions 
Frictionless (FLEX) No wage/price stickiness No cyclical fiscal policy response 
No policy (NRIG) Model with nominal rigidities No cyclical fiscal policy response 
Standard fiscal policy rule 
(CCPOL) 
Model with nominal rigidities  
Counter-cyclical fiscal response to employment gap and the 
relative price  
Budgetary-neutral fiscal 
policy rule (BNPOL) 
Model with nominal rigidities  
Budgetary-neutral fiscal response to employment gap and the 
relative price 
 
The ex ante budgetary-neutral policy is captured by the fiscal instrument rule (4.4): 
, , 1
1
(1 ) (1 )NT t NT t NTG G G Z t
t t
G G G Z
G G G
ρ ρ ρ ξ−
−
= + − + −  
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where ˆ ˆ[ , , ]T NTZ L Y P P=  implies a shift in the composition of government consumption 
in response to fluctuations in the employment gap, the output gap, and the relative price 
between both sectors, respectively. Gaps are expressed as per-cent deviations of actual 
levels from levels in the flexible economy without wage and price stickiness. To keep 
the analysis short, we only show results for employment gap stabilisation in the case of 
economy-wide shocks and for a response to sectoral output prices in the case of sectoral 
shocks. Results for output gap stabilisation are similar to results for policy rules 
targeting the employment gap. For example, in the case of cyclical unemployment 
(negative employment gap), the government shifts purchases from the tradable to the 
non-tradable sector ( 0Zξ < ) to reduce imports and increase demand in the non-tradable 
sector instead. We focus our analysis on the fiscal response to gaps rather than absolute 
levels of employment in order to examine how fiscal policy may contribute to 
stabilising business cycle fluctuations that emerge from the combination of structural 
rigidities and country-specific shocks. Hence, the policy aims at bringing employment 
(output) in an economy with nominal rigidities closer to the flexible-economy solution. 
Impulse responses for the expenditure-switching policy (BNPOL) in this section use a 
parameter value 10Zξ = − , which implies that a 1 percentage-point decline in the 
employment gap is accompanied by an expenditure shift from tradables to non-tradables 
of 1 percentage point of GDP. The policy rule also includes some endogenous 
persistence in the policy instrument ( 0.5Gρ = ) to proxy the tendency of policy makers 
to smooth variations in the policy instrument. 
As benchmark for comparison we use the simple counter-cyclical spending rule 
(CCPOL) that adjusts the overall level of government purchases in response to the 
employment gap: 
 1
1
ˆ(1 ) (1 )t tG G G Z t
t t
G G G L
Y Y Y
ρ ρ ρ ξ−
−
= + − + −  (4.6) 
Stabilising the employment gap under CCPOL implies an increase in government 
purchases under cyclical unemployment to bring employment in the economy with 
nominal rigidities closer to its potential level. A parameter value of 2Zξ = −  is chosen 
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for the CCPOL rule, so that a negative employment gap of 1% triggers an expenditure 
increase by 1 percentage points of GDP. 
 
4.3.1 Positive interest rate shock (economy‐wide demand contraction) 
Impulse responses for a positive interest rate shock (increasing risk premia) in the 
frictionless economy (FLEX), the economy with nominal rigidities (NRIG), the 
economy with standard counter-cyclical government spending (CCPOL) and the 
budgetary-neutral expenditure shift (BNPOL) responding to the employment gap are 
shown in Figure 15.  
Figure 15: Positive interest rate shock and policy response to the employment gap 
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A temporary increase in interest rates relative to the rest of monetary union increases 
domestic borrowing costs and dampens domestic consumption and investment demand. 
Falling domestic demand triggers sharp wage and price adjustment in the frictionless 
economy (FLEX) and leads to sharp real exchange rate depreciation that improves the 
trade balance. Price and wage stickiness (NRIG) delay the drop in prices and wages. 
The gradual price adjustment leads to a period of high real interest rates, which further 
reduces domestic demand and activity compared to the flexible economy. 
The classical deficit-spending policy (CCPOL) responds to the employment gap by 
increasing government purchases. The policy reduces the output and employment gap 
compared to the NRIG economy. However, the deficit spending approach leads to a 
further deterioration of the government debt-to-GDP position on top of the impact of 
lower tax revenue and the decline in the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
Contrary to CCPOL, the expenditure-switching rule policy BNPOL shifts government 
purchases from tradables to non-tradables to increase the demand for domestic output at 
the expense of lower imports to stabilise domestic activity and employment.43 The IRFs 
in Figure 15 suggest that this policy outperforms the standard counter-cyclical policy 
rule with respect to the stabilisation of domestic activity and leads to further trade 
balance improvement through lower import demand. The partial leakage of fiscal 
stimulus to imports associated with the CCPOL rule is absent in the BNPOL case. 
Finally, BNPOL succeeds in dampening the increase of government debt to GDP in the 
recession. The combination of ex ante constant total government purchases under 
BNPOL with the superior output and employment stabilisation, which dampens the tax 
revenue decline and the negative denominator effect substantially, leads to only 
moderate increases in government debt to GDP compared to CCPOL. The government 
debt increase is low even in comparison with the no-policy case (NRIG).  
 
                                                 
43 The policy response is shown by the strong increase of non-tradable (NT) government purchases 
relative to GDP in Figure 15, which is accompanied by a reduction in tradable (T) government purchases. 
The IRFs also show an increase in NT government purchases for CCPOL. However, the increase of NT 
government purchases relative to GDP in the case of CCPOL derives from the increase in overall 
government purchases relative to GDP under the counter-cyclical policy response. The composition of 
government purchases (NT versus T goods) remains unchanged under CCPOL.  
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4.3.2 Positive productivity shock (economy‐wide supply expansion) 
Impulse responses for a temporary productivity (TFP) increase in the small open 
economy are shown in Figure 16.  
Figure 16: Positive TFP shock and policy response to the employment gap 
 
 
Output in the frictionless economy (FLEX) closely tracks the TFP rise. Private 
consumption increases in response to the shock and employment remains fairly stable.44 
Net exports and the trade balance increase because of the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate associated with falling costs of domestic production. The output increase 
                                                 
44 More particularly, employment increases slightly in reaction to the temporary labour tax decline, which 
is a consequence of the budgetary closure rule given the temporary decrease in the government debt-to-
GDP ratio. 
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is less pronounced in the economy with price and wage stickiness (NRIG). Price 
stickiness delays the fall in domestic goods prices and leads to a period of higher real 
interest rates, so that consumption increases less than the production potential. As 
aggregate demand falls short of the higher potential output, employment falls sharply 
due to declining labour demand. Lower employment reduces labour income, so that LC 
consumption even declines on impact. The gradual decline in domestic prices and the 
subdued response of domestic demand to the productivity gain lead to more persistent 
real exchange rate depreciation and a more persistent trade balance surplus in the 
medium term compared to the FLEX case. 
In response to an economy-wide positive supply shock, the standard counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy response (CCPOL) consists of increasing government purchases to bring 
output closer to potential and reduce the negative employment gap (Figure 16). Again, a 
fiscal parameter value of 2Zξ = −  implies that a negative employment gap of 2.5% on 
impact is accompanied by an expenditure increase of 2.5 percentage points of GDP. The 
increase in government purchases reduces the gap between FLEX economy and NRIG 
economy, but the government debt-to-GDP ratio increases in the medium term. Higher 
government purchases also increase imports and dampen the trade balance 
improvement. 
The budgetary-neutral government expenditure switching (BNPOL), on the other hand, 
shifts government consumption from tradables to non-tradables to increase the demand 
for domestic output at the expense of lower import demand. A fiscal parameter value of 
10Zξ = −  implies that the 2.8 percentage-point negative employment gap on impact 
triggers an expenditure shift to non-tradables of 1.4 percentage points of GDP. Similar 
to the interest rate shock, the IRFs suggest that a budgetary-neutral shift of government 
consumption to non-tradable goods can achieve stronger stabilisation of domestic 
activity than a standard counter-cyclical expenditure rule. The temporary decrease of 
government consumption of tradables reduces the import demand and further increases 
the trade balance surplus. The adjustment of the composition of government purchases 
leaves the overall level of government expenditure (approximately) constant and lowers 
government debt to GDP through the increase of the denominator and the stabilisation 
of tax revenues. 
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4.3.3 Sector‐specific productivity shock (tradable supply expansion)  
We, finally, discuss IRFs for a scenario with sector-specific shocks, namely an 
exogenous increase in tradable relative to non-tradable sector productivity (Figure 17). 
Since the positive TFP shock in the tradable sector reduces tradable relative to non-
tradable production costs and prices in the economy without nominal stickiness, 
household in FLEX adjust the composition of demand away from non-tradables to 
tradables. Price stickiness in NRIG delays the fall in T/NT relative prices, however, and 
therefore leads to inefficient T/NT demand and T/NT output patterns that deteriorate the 
consumption-leisure trade-off relative to the FLEX economy. Given price stickiness, 
household demand contains too much non-tradables, that are relatively costly to 
produce, and too little tradables, that are produced with higher resource efficiency.  
We have tested the standard counter-cyclical pending rule (CCPOL) and the budgetary-
neutral expenditure shifting rules (BNPOL) as before with the employment gap as 
indicator of the cyclical position, but also using relative T/NT prices instead. In the case 
of BNPOL, the latter takes the form of including the relative price T NTP P  in the policy 
rule: 
 , , 1
1
(1 ) (1 ) lnNT t NT t NT TG G G P
t t NT
G G G P
G G G P
ρ ρ ρ ξ−
−
⎛ ⎞= + − + − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (4.7) 
We set 2Pξ =  for illustrate purposes, which implies that a 1 percentage-point decline in 
the relative price is accompanied by an expenditure shift from non-tradables to tradables 
of 0.2 percentage points of GDP. Contrary to the standard counter-cyclical spending 
rule, which only adjust overall expenditure, the reallocation in government purchases 
from non-tradables to tradables directly targets relative T/NT demand. 
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Figure 17: Positive tradable TFP shock and policy response  
to the relative goods price 
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government demand for tradable goods also increases import demand, however, and 
reduces the trade balance surplus associated with lower tradable production costs.45 
 
                                                 
45 As the standard policy rule (CCPOL in Figure 17) only adjust overall levels of government purchases, a 
fiscal parameter value of P 1ξ =  implies a reduction in government purchases in response to lower 
tradable prices. 
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4.4  Welfare analysis 
The welfare implications of the expenditure-reallocation rule (4.4) can be evaluated 
based on a second-order Taylor expansion of the underlying utility function:46 
 1 10
0
1 ( ) ( )
1 1
t i i
t t
t
E C Lσ ϕκβ σ ϕ
∞ − +
=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟− +⎝ ⎠∑  (4.8) 
around the deterministic steady state. Household utility is additive in private 
consumption itC  and work 
i
tL . The parameters β, 1/σ, κ and 1/φ are the discount factor, 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the weight of the disutility of work in total 
utility, and the elasticity of labour supply, respectively. The calibrated model uses 
β=0.995, σ=1, κ=1 and 1/φ=0.25 (see Chapter 3). The second-order Taylor 
approximation of (4.8) around the steady state yields: 
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 (4.9) 
where ˆ itC  with ( , )i NLC LC=  and ˆtL  ˆ ˆ( )NLC LCL L=  denote log-deviations of 
consumption and employment from their deterministic steady-state values.47 Following 
Bergin et al. (2007) and Evers (2012), unconditional welfare can be decomposed into 
the mean effect ( meanζ ) and the volatility effect ( varζ ): 
 ˆ ˆ( )mean i t tC EC L EL
σ ϕζ κ−= −  (4.10) 
 var 1 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) var( )
2 2
i
t tC Var C L L
σ ϕσ κϕζ − − − += − −  (4.11) 
                                                 
46 A detailed description of the methodology of welfare comparisons is available in Kim and Kim (2003) 
and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). Similar exercises of measuring welfare include Elekdağ and 
Tchakarov (2007), Bergin et al. (2007), Ferrero (2009), Evers (2012), Kumhof and Laxton (2013b) and 
Vogel et al. (2013). 
47 We have also computed household welfare based on a utility function including government purchases 
as in Tervala (2008) and Vogel et al. (2013), where the steady-state share of government purchases in 
GDP is assumed to fulfil the optimality conditions for household utility. While the inclusion of 
government purchases in utility affects the numerical results for the welfare effects, it does not affect the 
relative performance of the policy rules and the order of magnitude of welfare gains in our simulations. 
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where the overall welfare impact is: varwelf meanζ ζ ζ= + . We show overall welfare 
effects ( welfζ ) for a fiscal reaction to the employment gap under the combination of 
economy-wide interest rate and TFP shocks and measure welfare gains or losses relative 
to the sticky economy without fiscal stabilisation. Welfare effects are reported in per 
cent of steady-state consumption. We show results over intervals for the fiscal rule 
parameter ( Zξ ) instead of focusing exclusively on welfare-maximising values within the 
range. The broader parameter range illustrates differences between LC and NLC 
welfare, highlights the loss associated with non-optimal policy and provides information 
on the robustness of welfare effects with respect to variations in Zξ . 
Figure 18: Welfare effects for policy response to the employment gap 
 
Note:  Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state 
consumption. Panels a) and b) provide welfare effects for a budget closure based on 
distortionary labour taxes. Panels c) and d) provide welfare effects for a budget closure based 
on non-distorting lump-sum taxes. 
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In the case of the standard counter-cyclical fiscal policy rule (4.6), the government 
increases the level of its expenditure for 0Zξ <  in response to negative employment 
gaps to increase domestic demand and stabilise employment and activity. For a 
parameter value of 2Zξ = − , this policy improves average welfare by 0.25% of steady 
state consumption, but with opposite effects for both types of households (see Figure 
18). LC household welfare increases by around 0.7%, while NLC households 
experience moderate welfare losses of around 0.1% of steady state consumption 
compared to the no-policy case. The asymmetry between LC and NLC households 
holds for TFP and interest shocks. The result is in line with Kumhof and Laxton 
(2013b) who show that a large share of welfare improvements from fiscal stabilisation 
is due to the ability of fiscal policy to stabilise the income of LC households. 
The expenditure-switching rule (4.4) achieves welfare gains for both LC and NLC 
households for 0Zξ < . For 10Zξ = − , a shift in the composition of government 
purchases implies welfare gains of around 0.7% of steady-state consumption for NLC 
households and circa 1.9% for LC households. The welfare gains for LC households are 
substantial higher than in the case of the standard deficit spending rule due to the fact 
that the T/NT expenditure rule is more efficient in stabilising domestic activity, wage 
income and LC consumption and avoids offsetting effects from higher distortionary 
taxes in the context of budgetary stabilisation. The welfare effects of counter-cyclical 
policies are generally larger for LC consumers, who are unable to smooth their 
consumption over time and, hence, benefit more than NLC consumers from fiscal 
policies that stabilise temporary income fluctuations. Contrary to the standard deficit 
spending rule, the expenditure-shifting rule does not imply a trade-off between LC and 
NLC welfare, however.48 
To highlight the second-round effects from the budget closure by distortionary taxation, 
Figure 18 also displays welfare effects under a budget closure based on non-distorting 
lump-sum taxes levied on NLC households (panels c and d). We find that the lump-sum 
closure increases welfare gains from the standard counter-cyclical fiscal expenditure 
                                                 
48 The welfare effects for output stabilisation (output gap) are similar in magnitude and distribution for 
NLC and LC households to the results for employment stabilisation and are omitted for the sake of 
brevity. 
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rule (CCPOL) for both types of households, with the biggest increase (up to 1% of 
steady-state consumption) for NLC households. The higher stabilisation gain under the 
lump-sum closure derives from the lack of offsetting welfare losses associated with 
increasing labour taxes in the context of a rising government debt-to-GDP ratio. In 
contrast, welfare results for the expenditure-switching rule (BNPOL) do not indicate 
higher welfare gains under the lump-sum closure. This is due to the fact that the state-
dependent sectoral shift of purchases keeps overall government purchases 
(approximately) constant and stabilises employment and output more efficiently than 
the standard counter-cyclical fiscal policy rule. Hence, the increase in the government 
deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio and the associated increase in labour taxes are on average 
less pronounced under BNPOL than in the no-policy case (NRIG). Consequently, the 
welfare gains from BNPOL relative to NRIG increase with the labour tax closure. This 
finding suggests that a budgetary-neutral expenditure shift (BNPOL) becomes 
particularly attractive in situations where stabilisation policies have to be financed by 
distorting taxes in the medium run. 
The welfare effects for a sector-specific TFP shock under policy responses to the 
relative price ( T NTP P ) are shown in Figure 19.  
Figure 19: Welfare effects for policy response to relative prices 
 
Note:  Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed in % of steady state 
consumption. 
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mainly accrue to NLC households. In contrast, a shift in government purchases from the 
non-tradable to the tradable sector ( 0Pξ > ) increases welfare by 0.1% – 0.2% of steady-
state consumption for LC and NLC households within the interval displayed. 
Table 12 decomposes overall welfare into mean and variance effects to gain more 
insights into the origin of welfare effects.  
Table 12: Welfare decomposition for different policy and shock scenarios 
 Standard policy rule (CL) Budgetary-neutral policy rule (BN) 
 Economy-wide supply and demand shock Employment stabilisation (L_GAP) 
Ricardians (NLC)  
W-overall 0.0205 0.8109 
W-mean overall -0.0835 0.5847 
     W-mean Consumption 0.1898 1.3393 
     W-mean Labour -0.2733 -0.7546 
W-variance overall 0.1040 0.2262 
     W-variance Consumption 0.0001 -0.0033 
     W-variance Labour 0.1039 0.2295 
Liquidity-constrained (LC)  
W-overall 0.7615 2.1351 
W-mean overall 0.6278 1.7765 
     W-mean Consumption 0.9011 2.5310 
     W-mean Labour -0.2733 -0.7546 
W-variance overall 0.1337 0.3586 
     W-variance Consumption 0.0298 0.1291 
     W-variance Labour 0.1039 0.2295 
 
Sector-specific TFP shock 
Relative price stabilisation ( T NTP P ) 
Ricardians (NLC)   
W-overall 0.0273 0.2051 
W-mean 0.0267 0.1973 
     W-mean Consumption 0.0286 0.2294 
     W-mean Labour -0.0019 -0.0321 
W-variance 0.0006 0.0078 
     W-variance Consumption 0.0002 0.0008 
     W-variance Labour 0.0004 0.0070 
Liquidity-constrained (LC)   
W-overall 0.0017 0.0835 
W-mean 0.0040 0.0821 
     W-mean Consumption 0.0058 0.1142 
     W-mean Labour -0.0018 -0.0321 
W-variance -0.0023 0.0014 
     W-mean Consumption -0.0026 0.0008 
     W-mean Labour 0.0003 0.0070 
Note:  Welfare is measured relative to non-stabilisation and expressed as percent of steady state 
consumption.  
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The decomposition indicates to which extent welfare gains and losses derive from 
changes in the mean levels of consumption and employment or from changes in the 
volatility of these variables. As we run simulations over a range of the fiscal 
stabilisation parameter ( Zξ ), Table 12 only shows the maximum average welfare gains 
for both policy rules and economy-wide versus sectoral shocks.  
The decomposition in Table 12 illustrates that welfare gains are associated 
predominantly with level rather than volatility changes. For example, circa ¾ of the 
welfare gains from a simple policy rule adjusting the sectoral composition of 
government purchases in response to the size of the employment gap are related to level 
effects and circa ¼ to volatility reduction. The welfare gains associated with the fiscal 
policy rules in Table 12 are due mainly to higher consumption levels for both types of 
households. Employment increases on average given the higher marginal return to 
labour in the context of capital deepening and the smoother path of labour tax rates 
associated with the stabilisation of government finances. The higher average levels of 
consumption in the presence of fiscal stabilisation are accompanied by lower average 
wealth accumulation by NLC households, indicating that stabilisation policy dampens 
the incentive for households to accumulate wealth to insure against income shocks 
(precautionary savings).  
 
4.5  Conclusion 
Using a two-sector New Keynesian DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities, this 
chapter analyses the stabilising properties of simple fiscal policy rules in a small 
member country of monetary union. The model is parameterised to replicate time series 
features of small euro area countries. In counterfactual experiments, this approach 
focuses on simple policy rules that adjust the composition of government purchases 
between tradable and non-tradable goods in response to indicators of the economy’s 
cyclical position. The expenditure-switching policy is ex ante budgetary-neutral, which 
allows for stabilisation policy even when the government’s fiscal limit is tight. 
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This chapter shows that a temporary shift in government purchases between tradables 
and non-tradables in response to fluctuations in domestic activity can achieve 
substantial welfare gains of more than 1% of steady-state consumption for the 
population average and around 2% for liquidity-constrained households in the event of 
economy-wide supply and demand shocks as well as sector-specific shocks. Welfare 
gains of the expenditure-switching rule are higher compared to a standard counter-
cyclical policy rule that adjusts the overall level government purchases. The 
expenditure-switching policy is budgetary neutral ex ante, but even tends to improve the 
budgetary situation in a recession relative to the no-policy case and contrary to the 
standard deficit spending rule. The reason is the combination of ex ante neutrality with a 
stabilisation of activity and tax revenues. The expenditure-switching rule therefore 
avoids offsetting effects from pro-cyclical budgetary closure rules that, e.g., lead to 
additional increases in tax rates in recessions in order to stabilise government deficit and 
debt levels in the context of higher expenditure. Hence, the expenditure-switching 
approach may provide stabilisation when the fiscal policy is severely constraint by high 
debt and borrowing costs.  
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5 
The real profits and losses of 
TARGET2 balances* 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Chapter 5 is based on Erler and Hohberger (2014). I would like to thank Bernhard Herz and Matthias 
Kollenda for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 108 
 
 
 109 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The existence of German claims on the Eurosystem through TARGET249 has gained 
increasing attention since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 as well as during 
the twin debt and banking crisis in the euro area. Figure 20 shows that claims of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank on the Eurosystem increase from close to zero to more than 700 
billion euros at the end of 2012. During 2013 the claims reduce slightly to around 600 
billion euros.50 
A closer look at the TARGET2 balances within the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
reveals that TARGET2 imbalances are concentrated on a few member countries (see 
Figure 21). Apart from Germany’s almost 600 billion euros, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Finland additionally accumulated 200 billion euros of TARGET2 
claims vis-à-vis Austria, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. Particularly Italy 
and Spain have accumulated TARGET2 liabilities of about 550 billion euros. 
Figure 20: Germany’s TARGET2 claims on the Eurosystem (in bn. euros) 
 
 
                                                 
49 TARGET denotes Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express Transfer and refers 
to the European transaction settlement system through which commercial banks make payments. 
50 For a detailed balance sheet description of the TARGET2 mechanism, see Cecchetti et al. (2012). For a 
more analytical framework of the origins and development of TARGET2 positions and their potential 
financial risks, see Bindseil and König (2012). 
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Figure 21: TARGET2 balances within EMU, August 2013 (in bn. euros) 
 
 
The literature on TARGET balances has become quite extensive over the last three 
years. While some authors deal with several problems at once and others with specific 
aspects, the academic literature on TARGET2 balances cannot easily be classified. To 
highlight two main directions, one strand focuses specifically on the time period during 
the financial crisis in 2007 when countries like Greece and Portugal apparently financed 
their current account deficits through TARGET2 liabilities (Sinn and Wollmershäuser 
2012a,b; Cecchetti et al. 2012; Mayer et al. 2012). This interpretation is confirmed, for 
instance, by a panel analysis by Auer (2013). He finds that current account balances 
were entirely unrelated to the evolution of TARGET2 balances before the onset of the 
financial crisis 2007; however, in the period after 2007 a correlation of 0.808 supports 
the interpretation that current account imbalances are being financed by central bank 
liquidity that has replaced private capital flows. The other strand argues that TARGET2 
balances reflect a funding crisis within the euro area since 2011 (Buiter et al. 2011; 
Bindseil and König 2012; Cecioni and Ferrero 2012; Mody and Bornhorst 2012). Mody 
and Bornhorst (2012) argue that TARGET2 mirrors a reversal of capital flows within 
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comprehensive analysis and an extensive literature review of TARGET2 balances in the 
context of the crisis in the euro area. 
The studies have in common that they focus on the dynamics of the TARGET2 system, 
in particular, by answering questions like, how do TARGET2 balances arise, and what 
are the economic implications of holding TARGET2 claims. CESifo (2014), for 
instance, calculates the potential losses for Germany in case of a euro area collapse and 
the subsequent insolvencies of the respective crisis economies. The calculation points 
out that holding TARGET2 claims might lead to potential losses of about 470 bn. euros. 
Contrary, Fahrholz and Freytag (2012) discuss potential economic costs in real terms, 
which would be associated with future developments of TARGET2 balances – however, 
these costs are not quantified.  
Summarising, the existing literature primarily focuses on potential risks and costs, 
which are associated with a breakdown of the TARGET2 system, e.g. the costs in case 
of a euro area collapse or a member country exit. In contrast, this chapter evaluates the 
current economic losses incurred from holding TARGET2 claims in real terms. Since 
TARGET2 claims and liabilities are interest-bearing and generally remunerated at the 
interest rate of the ECB’s main refinancing operations (Deutsche Bundesbank 2011), 
Germany receives, on the one hand, nominal interest for holding TARGET2 claims vis-
à-vis the deficit countries. On the other hand, the nominal revenues have to be adjusted 
by price level changes over time, i.e. by the real exchange rate to account for real 
imbalances within the euro area. Due to the focus on real terms, this approach is able to 
shed light on the dimension of TARGET2 to misallocations of real resources within the 
euro area. 
Using a stylised two-period model based on the approach by Jin and Choi (2013), we 
find that by the end of 2013 Germany has incurred accumulated losses of around 13 
billion euros in real terms. Additionally, calculating the real profits and losses for every 
euro area member country reveals that the TARGET2 system acts as an implicit 
distribution mechanism with a cumulated distribution volume of about 30 billion euros. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the stylised background of 
TARGET2 as a balance of payment adjustment mechanism. Section 5.3 describes the 
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empirical framework, evaluates and discusses the real profits and losses of TARGET2 
balances. The main findings are summarised in section 5.4. 
 
5.2  Adjustment mechanism in a currency union by TARGET2 
In order to assess the real costs and profits of Germany’s TARGET2 claims we follow 
the approach by Jin and Choi (2013) and compare the accumulation of TARGET2 
claims in a currency union with an accumulation of foreign reserves in a fixed exchange 
rate regime.51 Analogously to, e.g., Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012b), Neumann (2012) 
and Homburg (2012), we make use of the balance of payment identity: 
 0CA KA S+ +Δ ≡  (5.1) 
where KA KI KE= − . The current account balance, CA , mirrors the capital account 
balance, KA , defined as the difference of private and public capital imports KI  over 
capital exports KE . The term SΔ  depicts the balance of payment equilibrating 
mechanism and should be zero in floating exchange rate regimes. In a fixed exchange 
rate regime the term SΔ  corresponds to the changes in foreign exchange reserves. 
Assuming a country whose current account deficit cannot be financed by capital inflows 
(net borrowing), the central bank sells her foreign reserves to provide domestic debtors 
with foreign currency to balance their liabilities. In EMU, the foreign reserves ( SΔ ) are 
replaced by TARGET2 balances due to the loss of autonomous monetary policy and the 
abandonment of national currencies (see Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012a). 
The similarity in the adjustment mechanism of foreign reserves and TARGET2 balances 
is illustrated in a very stylised balance sheet of a central bank (see Figure 22). We 
assume two current account surplus countries, one in a fixed exchange rate regime (e.g. 
China) and one in a currency union (e.g. Germany as member of EMU). 
                                                 
51 For further discussions about the similarities between TARGET2 balances and balance of payment 
crisis in fixed exchange rate regimes, see Kohler (2012) and Bernholz (2012). 
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Figure 22: Central bank’s balance sheet 
 
 
Basically, assets like gold, government bonds, and foreign reserves (Reserves) as well 
as loans granted to commercial banks (Domestic Credit) are booked on the left-hand 
side, while the financing base (Base Money), which has been created by the central 
bank, is booked on the right-hand side as liabilities. In a fixed exchange rate regime 
without corresponding net private capital outflows the central bank of a current account 
surplus economy has to accumulate foreign exchange reserves to avoid appreciation 
pressure on the nominal exchange rate, thereby increasing the monetary base.52 In the 
case of a currency union the accumulation of foreign reserves is replaced by creating 
TARGET2 claims vis-à-vis the deficit countries to substitute for private capital flows. 
These similarities are also described in Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012a, 2012b). They 
point out that contrary to a fixed exchange rate regime there is no natural restriction in 
the sense of a limited stock of foreign reserves in the deficit countries. The central bank 
of a deficit country can incur as much TARGET2 liabilities as the banking system of the 
deficit country is able to provide sufficiently good collaterals. Since the standard of 
eligible collaterals can be lowered by the central bank there are de facto no limits for 
TARGET2 liabilities and claims. 
 
5.3  Quantifying real TARGET2 profits and losses 
As long as trade is financed by private capital flows, TARGET2 does not play an 
important role. Accordingly, Figure 23 depicts that during the pre-crisis period (2002 – 
2007) current account balances are financed by private capital flows as no clear 
                                                 
52 Accompanying risks of inflation and required sterilising options by reducing domestic credit have been 
left out for the sake of simplicity. 
A L A L
Reserves 10   Base Money 100 Reserves 10   Base Money 100
Domestic Credit 90 Domestic Credit 90
Reserves +5   Base Money +5 TARGET claims +5   Base Money +5
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime Currency Union
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relationship between TARGET2 balances and the current account can be observed. 
Since the beginning of the European debt and banking crisis in 2010 there seems to be a 
one-to-one relationship between current account balances and TARGET2 balances. This 
supports the assumption that private capital flows are replaced by TARGET2 balances 
(see Cecchetti et al. 2012; Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012b). 
Figure 23: Current account and changes in TARGET2 balances (in bn. Euros, 
based on Cecchetti et al. 2012)53 
 
 
To keep the calculation of current profits and losses as simple as possible, we subsume 
the dynamics of the TARGET2 mechanism in a two-period framework, following the 
approach by Jin and Choi (2013). In order to justify the simplification of our calculation 
approach, we show impulse response functions of a stylised small open economy model 
to gain some intuition behind the dynamics of the TARGET2 system.54 Macroeconomic 
data indicate that during the last decade Germany faced a persistent real exchange rate 
                                                 
53 Data of the national central bank TARGET2 balances were obtained from the CESifo institute and 
current account data from the European Commission. 
54 The simulation is based on a small open economy model within a monetary union according to Herz 
and Hohberger (2013). Some stylised information about the model structure and model equations can be 
found in the appendix. For a detailed description of the model see Herz and Hohberger (2013). 
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depreciation vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area (RoEA), which boosted exports and led to 
a growing trade surplus. We therefore simulate dynamic responses to a negative price 
shock in order to imitate Germany’s real exchange rate depreciation.55  
Figure 24 shows that a decline in domestic prices depreciates (increase) the real 
exchange rate, implying a current account surplus through an improvement of 
international competitiveness. Based on our assumption that private capital flows are 
substituted by TARGET2 balances, an increase in the current account is accompanied 
by an increase in TARGET2 claims. 
Figure 24: Impulse responses for a negative price shock 
 
The crucial point for the subsequent simplification derives from the adjustment 
dynamics to the steady state. A future appreciation (decrease) of the real exchange rate 
induces a reduction of the current account surplus as well as the TARGET2 claims. 
Hence, real exchange rate depreciation today must be balanced by real exchange rate 
appreciation in the future to ensure stationarity in the long-run. In Figure 24, the first 
period reflects the real exchange rate depreciation and the accumulation of TARGET2 
                                                 
55 A productivity shock or a risk premium shock would have similar effects on the real exchange rate 
(depreciation) and the current account. 
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claims, the second period (shaded gray) reflects the real exchange rate appreciation and 
the reduction of TARGET2 claims. 
 
5.3.1  Real profits and losses in a two‐period model 
Within our two-period framework, we assume that Germany’s trade surplus is financed 
by holding TARGET2 claims as private capital flows suddenly stop between countries 
(see Cecchetti et al. 2012; Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012b). Furthermore, we assume 
that trade depends on the real exchange rate (ε ). 
As baseline scenario, we assume that trade is balanced at the equilibrium real exchange 
rate 0ε  ( 0 0CA = ).56 If the real exchange rate differs from the equilibrium rate, Germany 
faces a trade surplus or deficit. For example, if Germany faces a real exchange rate 
depreciation vis-à-vis the RoEA ( 1ε ↑ , since 1 [ ]g CAε =  with '[ ] 0g CA > ), a trade 
surplus ( )CA+  occurs given the Marshall-Lerner-condition holds. Since trade must be 
balanced over two periods, Germany must have a trade deficit ( )CA−  in period 2. As 
private capital flows between both countries are replaced by TARGET2 balances ( )TB , 
the RoEA’s trade deficit is financed through Germany’s TARGET2 claims vis-à-vis the 
ECB, thus TB CA= . 
Given that TARGET2 balances are remunerated at the ECB’s main refinancing rate, i , 
Germany’s real trade surplus measured in foreign goods (TARGET2 claim vis-à-vis 
RoEA) grows to (1 )TB r+  in the second period, where r  is defined as the difference 
between nominal interest rate and RoEA’s inflation. Reversing this amount in period 2 
to finance the trade deficit, it has to be adjusted by the real exchange rate in period 2 to 
measure the revenues in domestic goods, 2(1 )TB r ε+ , where 2 [ (1 )]g TB rε = − + . Hence, 
the total real profit in period 1, which is realised in the second period is: 
 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
1((1 r ) [ (1 )] [ ])
(1 )
TB g TB r g TB
TB TB TBr rTB TBε ε
π
ε ε ε− = +
− +
−
= + −
= +  (5.2) 
                                                 
56 For the sake of simplicity we assume that the equilibrium real exchange rate is unity. 
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The profit equals the market value of the TARGET2 balance in period 2 plus the 
interest rate income in period 2 stemming from holding the TARGET2 balance in 
period 1 less the costs of setting up the balance in period 1. 
If Germany faces a real depreciation in period 1 and chooses to hold TARGET2 claims 
in order to finance its exports – private capital flows are no longer available – then 
1 1ε >  and 1 0TB > . Under this scenario, the development of profits and losses depends 
on the real interest rate r . This can be seen by differentiating (5.2) with respect to TB : 
 2(1 ) [ (1 )] ( ) ((1 ) '[ (1 )] '( ))r g TB r g TB TB r g TB r g TB
TB
π∂ = + − + − − + − + +∂  (5.3) 
Evaluating equation (5.3) at 0TB = , we get 
 (1 ) (0) (0) 0r g g r
TB
π∂ = + − = <∂ , (5.4) 
which implies that profit is decreasing in TB . In case of positive (negative) real interest 
rates, i.e. 0r >  ( 0)r < , Germany gains (incurs losses) by holding TARGET2 claims. 
 
5.3.2  Cumulative real profits and losses 
Since TARGET2 balances are not completely liquidated in each period, it is of 
particular interest to assess the cumulative profits and losses of Germany’s TARGET2 
claims. In order to accumulate the profits in each period, we assume that iTB  is the 
TARGET2 balance in period i , which is zero at the beginning of period 1. Hence, at the 
end of period 1, the TARGET2 balance 1( )TB  equals the trade surplus 1 1( )TB CA= . The 
corresponding TARGET2 balance in period 2 is given by 2 1 2TB TB TB= +Δ . As 
Germany holds a TARGET2 balance in period 2 2( )TB  its real costs are mirrored by 
2 2TB ε . Therefore, the corresponding profit in period 2 can be formulated as: 
 3 2 2 2 3 2 22 2 22 3 2(1 ) TBTB r TB r TB TBπ ε ε ε ε ε− = + −= +  (5.5) 
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The profit in period 2 equals the market value of the TARGET2 balance in beginning of 
period 3 plus the interest rate income in period 3 stemming from holding the TARGET2 
balance in period 2 minus the costs of holding the balance in period 2. Analogously, the 
profit of period t  can be expressed as follows: 
 1 1 1(1 )t t t t t t t t t t t t tTB TB rTBTB TBrπ ε ε ε ε ε+ + +− = + −= +  (5.6) 
In order to get the real value of cumulative TARGET2 profits at the end of period 2, the 
profit has to be evaluated with the real exchange rate in period 3 (market value of 2TB ). 
Additionally, the interest rate income resulting from previous TARGET2 balances and 
the costs of TARGET2 “interventions” in previous periods have to be considered. The 
cumulative profit in period 2 is given by: 
 3 1 1 2 2 2 3 12 12 2 2( )rTB r TB B TTB T Bε ε ε ε ε+ + − Δ∏ +Δ=  (5.7) 
Since 0 0TB =  and 2 2 1TB TB TBΔ = − , equation (5.7) can be rewritten as: 
 
3 1 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 3 2
2
2
1 2
2 ( ( ) )rTB r TB TB TB TB
TB rTB TB TB r TB T
B
B
T ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε ε
π π
+ + − + −
= + − + + −
∏
= +
=
 (5.8) 
According to equation (5.8), the cumulative real profit of holding TARGET2 balance in 
period T  is: 
 1 1
1 1 1
( )
T T T
T t t t t t
t t t
T T rTB TB tTB πε ε ε+ +
= = =
+ −∏ Δ == ∑ ∑ ∑  (5.9) 
In other words, the cumulative real profit of holding TARGET2 claims or liabilities can 
be obtained by adding up the real profits of each previous period. 
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5.3.3  Data 
The calculation of real profits and losses is based on monthly data and covers the years 
from 1999 to 2013. The real exchange rate between Germany and RoEA – based on 
seasonally adjusted HCPIs57 – is calculated with data from the European Commission. 
Precisely, the real exchange rate is given by * /P Pε = , where *P  is the HCPI of the 
euro area without Germany and P  is the HCPI of Germany, respectively. Both HCPIs 
are set to 100 in January 1999. As the RoEA’s HCPI is not available by itself, it is 
constructed in the following way: Firstly, the monthly relative changes of the HCPI of 
the euro area and the HCPI of Germany are calculated. Secondly, based on the ECB’s 
CPI weights, the German contribution to the monthly change of the HCPI of the euro 
area is removed to obtain a time series that only mirrors the monthly changes of the 
HCPI of the euro area without Germany. Lastly, these changes are accumulated to 
construct the HCPI of the rest of the euro area (RoEA).  
The monthly real interest rate is computed by dividing the difference between the 
ECB’s main refinancing rate and the RoEA’s annual inflation rate by 12. Specifically, 
*( ) /12r i π= − . 
Data of the national central bank TARGET2 balances are available from CESifo 
institute.58 In order to take into account price differentials between Germany and RoEA, 
the nominal TARGET2 balance of Germany is deflated by the HCPI of the RoEA to 
express the TARGET2 balance in units of foreign goods. 
 
                                                 
57 Seasonally adjusted HCPIs were constructed by using the X-12 procedure. 
58 For more detailed information, see: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/policy/Spezialthemen/Policy-
Issues-Archive/Target.html. 
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5.3.4  Current profits and losses for Germany 
Based on equation (5.2), we calculate Germany’s real monthly profits from holding 
TARGET2 balances.  
Figure 25: Cumulative real profits and losses of Germany 
 
According to the implementation of the common currency in January 1999 we compute 
the respective profits and losses in real terms for the period 1999m1 – 2013m6. The 
results for the accumulated profits are shown in Figure 25. It illustrates that in the early 
years of the currency union the accumulated profits in real terms, namely in constant 
1999 prices, were close to zero until 2007. The profits started to increase with the 
beginning of the global financial crisis, reaching its peak of nearly 4 billion euros in 
2010. The profits within this period were mainly driven by the accumulation of 
TARGET2 claims, positive real interest rates and expected future real exchange rate 
depreciation.59 However, since the end of 2011 Germany’s profits declined sharply and 
turned into losses. Since 2012, Germany’s real losses increase to around 13 billion 
                                                 
59 More intuition about the driving forces of profits and losses and the decomposition of annual profits is 
given later (see Figure 27). 
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euros. The results underline that even without an euro area break-up or exit of one 
member country, holding TARGET2 claims can cause high economic costs. 
Figure 26: Cumulative nominal and real profits and losses of Germany 
 
Looking at TARGET2 balances in nominal terms would yield a different picture (see 
Figure 26). As TARGET2 balances are remunerated at the ECB’s main refinancing rate 
– which is still positive – and because of the absence of nominal exchange rate 
fluctuations, holding TARGET2 claims results in respective profits in nominal terms. 
Adjusting for (real) differences, i.e. by incorporating the real exchange rate between 
Germany and the RoEA, it becomes evident that holding nominal TARGET2 claims 
incurs losses in real terms, however. 
After calculating Germany’s current losses it is of particular interest to assess what 
future profits and losses can be expected from holding TARGET2 claims. To analyse 
the driving forces we differentiate equation (5.2) with respect to 1,  ,  ,  t t t tTB r ε ε + , in 
order to gain some intuition on the general properties concerning the profit 
development: 
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 1(1 ) tt t
t
t
t
t
r TB
TB TB
π εε ε+∂ =∂
∂+ − − ∂  (5.10) 
 1t
t
ttTBr
π ε +∂ =∂  (5.11) 
 ( )1(1 )t tt t t
t
t
t
TT rB Bπ ε εε ε+
∂+ −∂ +∂ ∂= −  (5.12) 
 
1
(1 )t t t
t
TB rπε +
∂ = +∂  (5.13) 
Although future profits depend on the change of TARGET2 balances (5.10), the 
TARGET2 balances itself might be considered an endogenous process in the sense that 
a change in the trade balance is automatically accompanied by a change in TARGET2 
balance. Nevertheless, evaluating equation (5.10) at 0TB =  implies that the 
development of profits in real terms depends on the real interest rate r . For instance, in 
case of positive real interest rates, holding TARGET2 claims is associated with real 
profits and vice versa. This effect is based on the balance of payment adjustment 
mechanism in the currency union when private capital does not flow between member 
countries. Likewise, an increase in the real interest rate increases Germany’s profits 
from holding TARGET2 claims (5.11). 
A real exchange rate depreciation ( tε ↑ ) due to domestic prices decreasing relative to 
foreign prices, lowers Germany’s profit in real terms due to a deterioration of the terms 
of trade (5.12), i.e. a given amount in domestic goods realises a smaller amount in 
foreign goods. On the other hand, a future real exchange rate appreciation ( 1tε + ↓ ) 
decreases current profits (5.13), i.e. a given amount in foreign goods realises a smaller 
amount in domestic goods. Based on the partial derivatives, we are able to decompose 
the respective profit evolution of Germany. Figure 27 illustrates that since 2008 the 
losses were mainly driven by decreasing real interest rates and real exchange rate 
depreciations. 
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Figure 27: Decomposition of annual real profits and losses (in bn. euros) 
 
 
5.3.5  Future profits and losses for Germany 
Given the status quo, what can we expect to be a likely scenario concerning the future 
development of profits and losses in real terms? In order to give some intuition we 
calculate real profits and losses under 4 different scenarios. Specifically, we focus on 
the question what would happen if Germany liquidated its TARGET2 balance in period 
2.60 We assume that Germany has TARGET2 claims in real terms of about 418.5 bn. 
euros in period 1 and liquidates its claims in period 2. The theoretical discussion at the 
beginning of this sections points out that – from a German point of view – a real 
appreciation is needed in order to return to a balanced current account. As the current 
ratio of Germany’s consumer price index (HCPI) to the RoEA’s HCPI is 1.08, Germany 
is undervalued by 8 %. Based on a linear relationship between the TARGET2 balance 
and the real exchange rate, an appreciation rate of more than 15% would be necessary to 
reduce the TARGET2 balance to zero. Precisely, TARGET2 claims in real terms of 
about 418.5 bn. euros associated with a real exchange rate of about 1.08 in period 1 
                                                 
60 For simplicity reasons, the 4 scenarios are based on annual calculations. 
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implies a real exchange rate of 0.92 in period 2 in order to liquidate TARGET2 claims 
completely. This hypothetical scenario, namely a future real appreciation, can basically 
be achieved in two ways, all other things being equal: (i) inflation in Germany 
(domestic adjustment) or (ii) deflation in RoEA (external adjustment). 
Table 13: Alternative liquidation scenarios of Germany’s TARGET2 claims 
 
Table 13 reports the expected profits and losses from the liquidation of the German 
TARGET2 claims in case of domestic adjustment and external adjustment (RoEA) with 
respect to 4 different nominal interest rate scenarios. It indicates that both adjustment 
scenarios would imply different losses and highlight the sensitivity to alternative 
macroeconomic developments. If, for instance, Germany would liquidate its TARGET2 
claims in period 2, the accumulated losses would be substantial higher in case of a 
German inflation compared to a deflation in RoEA. The reason is that a future real 
exchange rate appreciation increases current losses (measured in domestic goods) due to 
an improvement in the terms of trade, as the given amount in foreign goods realises a 
smaller amount in domestic goods. As monetary policy is typically interested in 
preventing deflation, it is in our sense more plausible to assume that the real 
appreciation will be attained through an increasing price level in Germany. For that 
Variable Scenario 
(1) 
Scenario 
(1) 
Scenario 
(1) 
Scenario 
(1) 
Nominal interest rate 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 
TARGET2 balance 418.50 418.50 418.50 418.50 
∆TARGET2 balance - 418.50 - 418.50 - 418.50 - 418.50 
tε  1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 
1tε +  0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Domestic adjustment     
Inflation in Germany 17.05 17.05 17.05 17.05 
Inflation in RoEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Real interest rate 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 
Cumulative profits - 78.94 - 71.23 - 63.51 - 55.80 
External adjustment (RoEA)     
Inflation in Germany 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Inflation in RoEA - 14.57 - 14.57 - 14.57 - 14.57 
Real interest rate 14.57 16.57 18.57 20.57 
Cumulative profits - 22.76 - 15.04 - 7.33 0.38 
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reason the current German accumulated losses of about 13 bn. euros are expected to 
increase even further. 
Concerning the interest rate development, an increasing nominal interest rate would 
increase the profits from holding TARGET2 claims in period 1. As the current interest 
rate level appears to be very low in a historical context, we could expect rising interest 
rates that would in general contribute to increasing profits or decreasing losses, 
respectively. Nevertheless, it seems to be unlikely that interest rate increases might lead 
to profits which would outweigh the losses stemming from the real appreciation. 
Table 13 also indicates that – in theory – it would be possible to reduce the real 
TARGET2 balance back to zero without incurring any losses (scenario 4, external 
adjustment). Though, this scenario seems to be unlikely as in this situation the RoEA 
would face a sharp deflation accompanied by high nominal interest rates. 
Summarising the potential future developments – from a German perspective – further 
losses in real terms seem to be a likely scenario. Basically, the results are in line with 
Fahrholz and Freytag (2012). They argue that the emergence of TARGET2 balances 
contributes to persistent real misalignments. These misalignments are in principle 
mirrored by our quantified TARGET2 profits and losses in real terms. Fahrholz and 
Freytag (2012) point out that the TARGET2 balances have been substituted for the 
missing private capital flows between EMU countries. Thus, the TARGET2 balances 
can be considered non market based subsidies. In particular they help current account 
deficit economies to receive the necessary capital imports, which financial markets no 
longer offer to these countries. As long as these capital flows are non market based they 
no longer reflect the decision-making process of private agents and will therefore lead 
to an inefficient capital allocation. Accordingly, this development will result in high 
economic costs, which mainly have to be borne by economies with positive TARGET2 
balances such as Germany. 
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5.3.6  Distribution across the EMU member countries 
The TARGET2 system by itself is a “closed” system between EMU countries, i.e. if 
there is a country that incurs losses then there has to be a country, which gains. 
Therefore, the question arises how the profits and losses are distributed across the EMU 
member countries.  
Adapting the profit calculation approach to each member country of the EMU, the 
results indicate that the TARGET2 system implies a distribution mechanism. Figure 28 
shows that especially surplus European countries are associated with losses, while 
deficit European countries benefit from the TARGET2 system.  
Figure 28: TARGET2 system as distribution mechanism 
 
The respective profits and losses in Figure 28 are calculated in real terms but are 
reported in current prices for comparison reasons. The gross distribution volume is 
about 30 billion euros. Compared to all European “rescue packages” this volume 
appears to be relatively small. However, compared to the EU budget (payments 
appropriations) of about 130 billion euros in 2013, the volume seems to be quite high 
(nearly 25%). To some extent the implicit distribution mechanism of the TARGET2 
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system is similar to the economic effects of the introduction of Eurobonds, which would 
also lead to distributional effects between euro area member countries (e.g. Homburg 
2012; Hild et al. 2014). Through the adaption of Eurobonds, member countries with 
recently higher interest rates would benefit from the lower average interest rate of the 
Eurobond. In contrast, countries with relatively low interest rates, e.g. Germany, would 
face higher interest rate payments.  
Following Bindseil and König (2012), the TARGET2 system is a fundamental 
component of a well-functioning euro area and serves as an adjustment-buffer 
mechanism in the current European debt and banking crisis. TARGET2 balances buy 
time to implement structural reforms that may remove intra-European imbalances. 
Therefore, it is not only the southern European countries that provide an essential 
contribution to the structural adjustment process within the euro area.  
 
5.4  Conclusion 
It is often stated that TARGET2 balances mirror missing private capital flows due to 
structural imbalances in the euro area. Economists argue that if structural imbalances 
have been removed, private capital flows would recover and, thus, TARGET2 balances 
would disappear – without causing economic costs. The existing literature only focuses 
on potential costs and risks, which are associated with the TARGET2 system, e.g. the 
costs in case of a euro area collapse or a member country exit. These studies, however, 
seem to neglect the aspect that the TARGET2 system might be associated with current 
economic costs. The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the economic losses in real 
terms and gain insights into the distributional effects that come along with the 
TARGET2 system. 
Since TARGET2 balances are published in current prices, it seems to be inappropriate 
to provide arguments concerning the TARGET2 system on a nominal basis, while price 
differentials between member countries are in place. Taking these imbalances reliably 
into account, holding TARGET2 claims can incur losses in real terms – even without a 
collapse of the euro area. 
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The analysis suggests that by the end of 2013 Germany has incurred losses from 
holding TARGET2 claims of around 13 billion euros in real terms (in constant 1999 
prices). By adapting the calculation approach to each EMU member country, the results 
point out that the TARGET2 system can be considered as a distribution mechanism. On 
the one hand, this mechanism might help to finance necessary (real) adjustments. On the 
other hand, as real profits and losses basically mirror real differences within the EMU, 
the TARGET2 system cannot replace necessary reforms, but can provide time to reduce 
intra-EMU imbalances. TARGET2 balances are therefore economically equivalent to 
Eurobonds and the ESM. We should be aware of the fact that the TARGET2 system can 
incur losses in real terms, but doubting the TARGET2 system in general puts into 
question the existence of the monetary union. 
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5.5  Appendix 
To illustrate the dynamics of the TARGET2 mechanism we use a small open economy 
approach within a monetary union. The specific model is based on the small open 
economy model in Chapter 2. Figure 29 summarises the structure of the model.61 
Figure 29: Small open economy structure 
 
 
In the small open economy model in Chapter 2, trade is financed through private capital 
flows ( tNFA ). As we now assume now that private capital flows are totally substituted 
by TARGET2 (see Cecchetti et al. 2012; Sinn and Wollmershäuser 2012b), we can 
substitute tNFA  through TARGET2 balance, tTB , so that a trade surplus corresponds 
with a TARGET2 claim vis-à-vis the deficit country. To illustrate TARGET2 in Figure 
29, the financial flows between the domestic economy and Rest of EMU can be 
replaced by TARGET2 balances. Thus, we can rewrite the evolution of TARGET2 
balances as: 
                                                 
61 A detailed log-linear version of the model can be found in chapter 2.7.2. 
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 1 1(1 )t t H tTB i TB nxπ− −= + − +  (5.14) 
where t t tnx y c α ε= − − Δ  denotes net exports. 
Given the evolution of TARGET2 determined by the model, we may express the current 
account as the change in the TARGET2 balance ( tTB ): 
 1t t tca TB TB −= − . (5.15) 
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6 
Conclusions 
 132 
 
 
 133 
 
The main focus of this thesis was to analyse the potential of fiscal policy to stabilise 
asymmetric shocks and macroeconomic fluctuations for small open economies, with a 
specific focus on external imbalances. 
Chapter 2 has presented a small open economy model within two different monetary 
regimes, i.e. an economy inside and outside of a currency union. This setting has been 
used to analyse how fiscal policy affects the adjustment of the current account and other 
macroeconomic variables to productivity and risk premium shocks. The contribution of 
this approach to existing literature is to link fiscal policy directly to external imbalances 
and analyse the stabilising properties of such a rule based fiscal policy. The main 
findings from the analysis are that entry into the EMU makes the economy more 
vulnerable to productivity shocks – contrary to a risk premium shock. Beyond that, 
independent from the monetary regime and the nature of the shocks, fiscal policy faces 
a trade-off between stabilising fluctuations in the current account and output.  
In Chapter 3 a two-sector (tradable and non-tradable goods) DSGE model of a small 
open economy within a monetary union has been set up to tackle two policy relevant 
questions: First, to what extent can fiscal policy – that adjusts the composition of 
government purchases between tradables and non-tradables – help to stabilise 
fluctuations in the trade balance or domestic activity. And second, how does such an 
expenditure-composition rule perform in contrast to fiscal devaluation understood as a 
shift of the tax burden from labour to consumption in response to trade balance deficits. 
The analysis contributes to the existing literature by focussing on fiscal policy rules that 
adjust the composition of government purchases (tradables/non-tradables) in response to 
cyclical fluctuations. The policy rule is budgetary-neutral in the sense that the level of 
government expenditure is kept ex-ante constant. The main insights suggest that a state-
dependent sectoral reallocation of government purchases can dampen excessive 
fluctuations in the external accounts, but with accompanying welfare losses. In contrast, 
welfare gains can be obtained when fiscal policy targets the stabilisation of domestic 
activity. These findings highlight a trade-off between stabilising domestic activity and 
enhancing household welfare, on the one hand, and reducing excessive trade balance 
fluctuations, on the other hand. Fiscal devaluation as an alternative policy does not face 
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such a trade-off between lower excess volatility in external positions and domestic 
demand and generates welfare gains in our simulations. 
The analysis in Chapter 4 is based on the two-sector DSGE model of Chapter 3, but 
broadens the analysis of Chapter 3 by considering fiscal policy rules that adjust the 
composition of government purchases in response to domestic cyclical fluctuations, 
using a classical counter-cyclical policy rule as benchmark scenario, introducing sector-
specific shocks and providing a more extensive welfare analysis by adding lump-sum 
taxes as alternative budget closure. As the potential of fiscal policy as a stabilisation 
device is very restricted when fiscal limits are tight, the main characteristic of the policy 
rule is that the overall government expenditure is kept ex ante constant. We focus on the 
question whether a government expenditure-shift between tradables and non-tradables is 
an alternative to adjustment in the overall level of public sector demand in response to 
business cycle indicators. The main insights of this analysis suggest that an expenditure-
switching rule can achieve higher welfare gains compared to a standard counter-cyclical 
policy rule that adjust the overall level of government purchases. Beyond that, the 
budgetary-neutral expenditure policy tends to improve the budgetary situation in a 
recession relative to the no-policy case and contrary to the standard deficit spending 
rule. The reason is the combination of ex ante neutrality with a stabilisation of activity 
and tax revenues. This approach of a budgetary-neutral policy shift may provide 
stabilisation even in times of budgetary stress, i.e. when fiscal policy is severely 
constraint by high debt and borrowing costs.  
In Chapter 5 a stylised two-period model has been used to deal with the issue of 
TARGET2 imbalances within the euro area. The contribution of this approach is to 
evaluate the current economic losses in real terms incurred from holding TARGET2 
balances – even without an euro area collapse or a member country exit. The analysis 
highlights that in the last years, Germany’s real losses from holding TARGET2 claims 
have increased to 13 billion euros. The TARGET2 system can be considered a 
distribution mechanism with a volume of 30 billion euros. It acts as an emergency 
mechanism in times where private capital does not flow properly and, hence, might help 
to finance necessary (real) structural adjustments, on the one hand, and provide time to 
reduce intra-EMU imbalances, on the other hand. 
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Of course, the stabilisation potential of fiscal policy has many different dimensions and 
this thesis cannot provide a comprehensive picture of all possible channels through 
which fiscal policy may affect the adjustment process of macroeconomic fluctuations 
and external imbalances. Moreover, to keep the analysis tractable, the different small 
open economy frameworks rely on several simplifying assumptions, which help to 
concentrate on the main issues that are focus of this thesis. By shedding light on these 
new, so far unexplored research questions, I hope that my findings encourage further 
research on the stabilising potential of fiscal policy and the issue of external imbalances. 
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